dbcve.org
OS Command InjectionWeakness · CWE-78

CVE-2026-48787

HIGH · 7.4 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-06-19
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
gin-vue-admin is an AI-assisted basic development platform. In version 2.9.1, an authenticated attacker with access to the code-generation feature and MCP management interface can exploit this vulnerability by injecting attacker-controlled Go source code through POST /autoCode/addFunc, and then invoking POST /autoCode/mcpStart to trigger a rebuild and restart of the standalone MCP service. This allows arbitrary operating system commands to be executed on the server with the privileges of the application process. Successful exploitation may lead to remote code execution (RCE), modification of backend source code or runtime logic, deployment of persistent backdoors, access to or manipulation of application data and configuration, and further impact on local resources running under the same service account or privilege context. The risk is highest in deployments that retain the source tree, allow writes to source files, and support local build or startup of standalone MCP components. In environments using binary-only releases, read-only filesystems, or with local build capabilities removed, the exploitability of the full attack chain is significantly reduced. However, once the online code-generation capability and MCP-hosted startup workflow are enabled, the overall security impact may reach high to critical severity. As of time of publication, it is unknown if a patched version is available. As a workaround, enforce strict allowlist validation on path- and identifier-related fields such as `humpPackageName`, `packageName`, `FuncName`, and `Router`, and only permit safe identifier formats.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Authenticated attackers with access to gin-vue-admin's code-generation and MCP management features can inject malicious Go source code via POST /autoCode/addFunc. When POST /autoCode/mcpStart triggers a rebuild and restart of the MCP service, the injected code compiles and executes, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution with the application process privileges.

MitigationImplement strict allowlist validation on identifier fields (humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, Router) to enforce safe formats only. Consider disabling the online code-generation and MCP auto-rebuild features in high-risk deployments until an official patch is available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if gin-vue-admin is running
    Check for gin-vue-admin processes or web services listening on ports. Review your web server logs or running services for gin-vue-admin markers.
    Affected if gin-vue-admin software is present in the environment
  2. Verify autoCode API endpoints are exposed
    Check if POST /autoCode/addFunc endpoint is accessible in your deployment. Review API gateway or reverse proxy logs for requests to /autoCode/* paths.
    Affected if The autoCode API endpoints are publicly or insecurely accessible without proper authorization controls
  3. Confirm MCP rebuild feature is enabled
    Inspect configuration files for MCP-related settings. Look for mcpStart or MCP service configurations in the gin-vue-admin setup.
    Affected if MCP auto-rebuild feature (mcpStart endpoint) is enabled and accessible
  4. Audit existing autoCode functions for injection
    Query the database or configuration store for any unexpected functions added via autoCode/addFunc. Review the auto-generated Go source files in the project for suspicious code patterns.
    Affected if Unexpected or malicious Go functions exist in the autoCode-generated files
  5. Review access logs for exploitation attempts
    Search HTTP access logs for POST requests to /autoCode/addFunc and /autoCode/mcpStart from unexpected or unauthorized IP addresses or user accounts.
    Affected if Log analysis reveals unauthorized or suspicious requests to the vulnerable endpoints

A user is affected if gin-vue-admin is running with autoCode and MCP features exposed to untrusted users, and unauthorized function injection is present in the system.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement strict allowlist validation on identifier fields (humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, Router) to enforce safe formats only. Consider disabling the online code-generation and MCP auto-rebuild features in high-risk deployments until an official patch is available.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
32.0 hours of engineering $5,600
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-48787 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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