CVE-2026-48981
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedpam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. In versions prior to 0.9.2, pam_usb calls xmlReadFile() with flags=0 when loading the configuration file, allowing libxml2 to process external entity references (XXE), potentially making outbound network connections or local file reads at XML parse time from the context of the authenticating process. The vulnerability requires the configuration file to contain crafted XML entity references. Since pam_usb.conf is root-owned, direct exploitation requires prior write access to the config, but the defence-in-depth impact is significant given that pam_usb.so runs in setuid contexts (sudo, su). This issue has been fixed in version 0.9.2.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencepam_usb versions before 0.9.2 call xmlReadFile() with flags=0 when parsing pam_usb.conf, enabling XML External Entity (XXE) processing. This allows the authenticating process (running in setuid contexts like sudo/su) to make outbound network connections or read local files at XML parse time if the config contains crafted entity references. Exploitation requires prior write access to the root-owned config file.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check if pam_usb is installedLook for pam_usb binary, library, or configuration files on the system. Common paths include /usr/lib/security/pam_usb.so, /usr/bin/pam_usb*, or check package manager output (dpkg -l | grep pam_usb, rpm -qa | grep pam-usb, or pacman -Q pam_usb)Affected if pam_usb package or binary is found on the system
-
Determine installed pam_usb versionRun the version command for pam_usb if available (pam_usb --version), or query the package manager (dpkg -s pam_usb, rpm -qi pam_usb, or pacman -Q pam_usb) to obtain the exact version numberAffected if Version is present and less than 0.9.2
-
Locate pam_usb.conf configuration fileSearch for pam_usb.conf - common locations are /etc/pam_usb.conf, /etc/security/pam_usb.conf, or check the pam_usb documentation for the configured pathAffected if Configuration file exists and is readable by the checking user
-
Verify XML parsing vulnerability existsIf source code is available, inspect the source file that calls xmlReadFile() to confirm flags=0 is used. Otherwise, rely on version comparison since this flag setting was present in all versions before 0.9.2Affected if Installed version is below 0.9.2 and the configuration file is writable by an attacker (prior to exploitation)
User is affected if pam_usb version is below 0.9.2 and the pam_usb.conf configuration file exists on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade pam_usb to version 0.9.2 or later which implements secure XML parsing flags. If upgrade is not immediately possible, ensure the configuration file has restrictive permissions and monitor for unauthorized modifications.
pam_usb version 0.9.2
- 1. Check the current installed version of pam_usb by running 'pam_usb --version' or checking your package manager
- 2. Upgrade pam_usb to version 0.9.2 or later using your distribution's package manager (e.g., apt-get update && apt-get install pam-usb, yum update pam-usb, or dnf update pam-usb)
- 3. If upgrading from source, download version 0.9.2 or later from the official pam_usb repository and rebuild/install
- 4. Verify the installed version is 0.9.2 or higher using 'pam_usb --version'
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,464.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-48981 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-48981 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data