CVE-2026-49086
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImproper Input Validation, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') vulnerability in Apache Camel DAPR component. The camel-dapr Dapr Pub/Sub consumer (DaprPubSubConsumer) copied two fields from each inbound CloudEvent - its Pub/Sub component name and its topic - into the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic Exchange headers. These two headers are producer-direction routing headers: when the route republishes through a Dapr producer, DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy reads them back and prefers them over the destination configured on the endpoint. As a result, in a route that consumes from one Dapr Pub/Sub topic and republishes to another (for example from('dapr-pubsub:p:t').to('dapr-pubsub:p:other')), an actor able to publish a message to the subscribed topic could set the CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and topic to values of their choosing and cause the re-published message to be delivered to an arbitrary Dapr Pub/Sub component and topic instead of the configured destination - redirecting or exfiltrating the message and bypassing the route's intended routing and any topic-level access controls in the underlying broker. Exploitation requires the ability to publish to the topic the route subscribes to; no other authentication or user interaction is needed. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.12.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, remove the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers from the Exchange between the Dapr consumer and any Dapr producer in the route (for example removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName', 'CamelDaprTopic')), and restrict who can publish to the subscribed Dapr Pub/Sub topic so that only trusted producers can send to it.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn Apache Camel's DAPR component, the DaprPubSubConsumer copies inbound CloudEvent pub/sub name and topic fields into CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic exchange headers. When the route subsequently republishes through a Dapr producer, DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy reads these headers and uses them instead of the configured endpoint destination. An attacker who can publish to the subscribed topic can inject arbitrary pub/sub names and topics to redirect messages to unintended destinations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 4.12.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache Camel versionRun 'mvn org.apache.camel:camel-maven-plugin:4.x.x:version' or check the camel-core JAR manifest, or inspect the classpath for camel-core versionAffected if version falls within >= 4.12.0, < 4.14.8 OR >= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3 OR >= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0
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Verify DAPR component is in useSearch project dependencies for 'camel-dapr' or inspect runtime classpath for org.apache.camel.component.dapr.* classesAffected if camel-dapr dependency is present in the project
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Identify routes with Dapr consumer to producer chainReview Camel route definitions (Java DSL, XML, or YAML) for routes that use 'dapr:' consumers (dapr:pubsubname/topic) followed by a Dapr producer endpointAffected if a route consumes from a Dapr pub/sub topic and then sends to a Dapr producer endpoint without removing headers in between
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Inspect exchange headers for Dapr fieldsAdd a wiretap or logging step in the route to inspect exchange headers, specifically CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic, after the Dapr consumer and before the producerAffected if these headers are present and propagate from consumer to producer in the route flow
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Check for header sanitizationReview route code for removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName','CamelDaprTopic') or equivalent header stripping logic between the Dapr consumer and any subsequent Dapr producerAffected if no header removal occurs and a Dapr consumer is followed by a Dapr producer in the same route
User is affected if running a vulnerable Camel version with camel-dapr in use and a route that chains a Dapr pub/sub consumer directly to a Dapr producer without stripping the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.18.3/4.14.8 for LTS streams), or insert removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName','CamelDaprTopic') between the Dapr consumer and producer in affected routes.
4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x)
- Identify the current Apache Camel version in use by checking the project dependencies or pom.xml
- Determine which release stream the current version belongs to (4.12.x-4.14.x, 4.15.x-4.18.x, or 4.19.x-4.20.x)
- For 4.14.x LTS stream: upgrade to version 4.14.8
- For 4.15.x-4.18.x stream: upgrade to version 4.18.3
- For 4.19.x-4.20.x stream: upgrade to version 4.21.0
- Verify the upgrade by rebuilding and testing the application, specifically testing routes that use dapr-pubsub consumers and producers
- Confirm that the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers are no longer being used to override the configured destination
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-49086 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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