CamelApplication · Apache
CVE-2026-49097
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImproper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component. The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache Camel IRC component allows HTTP clients to set unprefixed irc.* headers (like irc.sendTo) that bypass HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, enabling redirection of IRC messages to attacker-chosen channels or users. This occurs when an HTTP consumer bridges to an irc: producer without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
CamelApplication
>= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Apache Camel versionCheck your project's pom.xml or the Camel version in your runtime (e.g., run Camel context info, check lib/camel-core jar manifest, or examine your dependency management)Affected if The version falls within any of these ranges: >= 4.0.0 and < 4.14.8, OR >= 4.15.0 and < 4.18.3, OR >= 4.19.0 and < 4.21.0
-
Confirm IRC component is in useSearch your Camel routes for 'irc:' in route definitions or check if the camel-irc dependency is present in your build configurationAffected if The IRC component is deployed and actively used in any Camel route
-
Detect HTTP-to-IRC bridgingExamine your Camel routes for a pattern where an HTTP consumer (from: 'servlet:*', 'jetty:*', or 'rest:*') is directly followed or linked to an IRC producer (to: 'irc:*')Affected if An HTTP endpoint consumers requests and passes them to an IRC producer in the same route or via a pipeline
-
Check IRC producer authenticationInspect the IRC producer URI parameters to verify whether 'username' and 'password' (or 'nickPassword') are configuredAffected if The IRC producer lacks authentication credentials (no username/password or nickPassword defined)
-
Look for unprefixed irc.* headersSearch route definitions and any header manipulation code for patterns like 'irc.sendTo', 'irc.channel', 'irc.target' or other 'irc.' prefixed headers being set or passed throughAffected if Your routes or client requests use unprefixed 'irc.*' headers that get forwarded to the IRC producer
You are affected if you run a vulnerable Camel version with an unauthenticated IRC producer that receives input from an HTTP consumer, and your routes or incoming requests use unprefixed irc.* headers that can redirect messages to arbitrary channels or users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for LTS 4.14.x, 4.18.3 for 4.18.x), then change header names from irc.* to CamelIrc* prefixes; alternatively, strip irc.* headers from untrusted ingress using removeHeaders('irc.*') before the IRC producer.
4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for LTS 4.14.x stream, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x stream)
- 1. Identify your current Apache Camel version by checking your project's dependency management (e.g., pom.xml for Maven).
- 2. Determine which release stream you are on: 4.14.x (LTS), 4.15.x-4.18.x, or 4.19.x-4.20.x.
- 3. If on 4.14.x stream, upgrade to version 4.14.8. If on 4.15.x-4.18.x stream, upgrade to 4.18.3. If on 4.19.x-4.20.x stream, upgrade to 4.21.0.
- 4. Update your project dependencies to use the new Camel version.
- 5. After upgrading, audit all routes that use the irc: producer and update any code that sets IRC headers using the old irc.* naming (e.g., irc.sendTo) to use the new CamelIrc* naming (e.g., CamelIrcSendTo).
- 6. Rebuild and redeploy your application.
- 7. Test that IRC messaging functionality works correctly with the new header names.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Camel
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-49097 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-49097 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data