CamelApplication · Apache

CVE-2026-49098

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-06
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 or later.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 6 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Kafka Component. The camel-kafka producer can override its configured target topic at runtime from the kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC Exchange header: KafkaProducer.evaluateTopic() returns the header value in preference to the topic configured on the endpoint. The control-header constants in KafkaConstants (for example OVERRIDE_TOPIC = kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC, OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP = kafka.OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP, PARTITION_KEY = kafka.PARTITION_KEY) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. camel-kafka's own KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy does filter the kafka.* namespace, but only on the Kafka-to-Exchange serialization boundary (reading Kafka record headers into the Exchange, and writing Exchange headers into a Kafka record); it does not apply to headers that arrive from an upstream consumer in a multi-component route. The upstream HTTP consumer uses HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, which blocks only the Camel / camel namespace, so a kafka.* header passes through unfiltered. As a result, in a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a kafka: producer, any HTTP client could set the kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC header and cause the message to be published to an arbitrary Kafka topic instead of the configured one - redirecting it to a sensitive internal topic, or injecting attacker-crafted messages into a topic consumed by a critical downstream service. The related kafka.OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP and kafka.PARTITION_KEY headers could likewise be injected to backdate messages or target specific partitions. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set or read Kafka headers via the raw header names must use the CamelKafka* names (for example CamelKafkaOverrideTopic and CamelKafkaTopic) instead of the old kafka.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the kafka.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the kafka: producer (for example removeHeaders('kafka.*') at the start of the route), and set the target topic from a trusted source.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Apache Camel Kafka Component allows runtime topic override via the kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC header. Since KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy only filters kafka.* headers at the Kafka-to-Exchange boundary but not from upstream consumers like HTTP, an attacker can inject kafka.* headers through HTTP requests to redirect messages to arbitrary Kafka topics or partitions, or backdate timestamps.

MitigationUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8/4.18.3 for LTS streams) and update code to use CamelKafka* prefixed header names (e.g., CamelKafkaOverrideTopic); alternatively, strip kafka.* headers at route ingress using removeHeaders('kafka.*').

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
CamelApplication
Affected:>= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check Apache Camel version
    Inspect the Camel version in your project dependencies (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build file, or application manifest)
    Affected if version falls within any of the affected ranges: >= 4.0.0 and < 4.14.8, OR >= 4.15.0 and < 4.18.3, OR >= 4.19.0 and < 4.21.0
  2. Identify Kafka producer routes
    Search your Camel route definitions for kafka: topic endpoints, particularly routes that receive input from non-Kafka sources such as HTTP (servlet, jetty, rest), file, or message queues
    Affected if routes exist that combine non-Kafka upstream consumers with kafka: producers without intermediate header filtering
  3. Inspect for header stripping at route ingress
    Review your route definitions for removeHeaders('kafka.*') or equivalent header filtering logic applied before messages reach the Kafka producer
    Affected if no removeHeaders('kafka.*') pattern is configured on routes that feed from HTTP or other external consumers into Kafka endpoints
  4. Verify KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy configuration
    Check if KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy is explicitly configured to filter inbound kafka.* headers from upstream consumers (note: by default it only filters at Kafka-to-Exchange boundary)
    Affected if KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy is not configured or only filters headers from Kafka consumers, not from HTTP/rest/file inputs
  5. Audit HTTP endpoints for Kafka header exposure
    Review your HTTP/rest DSL definitions to determine if incoming HTTP request headers can flow directly to Kafka producers without filtering
    Affected if HTTP endpoints pass all headers through to kafka: producers and no kafka.* header stripping is applied

You are affected if you run a vulnerable Camel version AND have routes where HTTP or other external consumers can inject kafka.* headers that reach Kafka producers without filtering.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0 or later
Fixed in 4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8/4.18.3 for LTS streams) and update code to use CamelKafka* prefixed header names (e.g., CamelKafkaOverrideTopic); alternatively, strip kafka.* headers at route ingress using removeHeaders('kafka.*').

Recommended fix High confidence

4.21.0 (or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x stream, or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS stream)

  1. Upgrade to one of the fixed versions: 4.21.0, 4.18.3, or 4.14.8 depending on your current release stream.
  2. After upgrading, update any code that sets or reads Kafka headers using the raw kafka.* header names to use the new CamelKafka-prefixed constants instead (e.g., use CamelKafkaOverrideTopic instead of kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC, CamelKafkaTopic instead of kafka.TOPIC, CamelKafkaPartitionKey instead of kafka.PER_PARTITION_KEY, CamelKafkaTimestamp instead of kafka.TIMESTAMP).
  3. Verify all routes that bridge HTTP consumers (or other non-Kafka consumers) into kafka: producers no longer use kafka.* headers for runtime overrides.
  4. If you cannot upgrade immediately, add a header filter at the start of affected routes: removeHeaders('kafka.*') to strip untrusted kafka.* headers from ingress before they reach the kafka: producer.
Caveat After upgrade, applications using the old kafka.* header constants (kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC, kafka.PARTITION_KEY, kafka.OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP) must be updated to use the new CamelKafka-prefixed constants (CamelKafkaOverrideTopic, CamelKafkaPartitionKey, CamelKafkaTimestamp)

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Camel Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
27.0 hours of engineering $4,800
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

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