CamelApplication · Apache
CVE-2026-49099
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component. The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id for CRUD operations, or redirecting an Apex REST call to a different endpoint and HTTP method (including destructive methods) with injected query parameters. All such operations run with the full permissions of the Salesforce connected (integration) user, which is typically broad. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via the raw header names must use the CamelSalesforce* names (for example CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery and CamelSalesforceApexUrl) instead of the old sObject* / apex* values; the endpoint-option spelling is unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Salesforce control headers from any untrusted ingress before the salesforce: producer (for example removeHeaders('sObject*') and removeHeaders('apex*') at the start of the route), and set the query, SObject and Apex parameters from a trusted source.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAuthorization bypass in Apache Camel Salesforce Component where non-Camel-prefixed control headers (sObjectQuery, sObjectSearch, sObjectName, sObjectId, apexUrl, apexMethod) pass through HttpHeaderFilterStrategy from inbound HTTP requests, allowing attackers to override intended Salesforce operation parameters and execute unauthorized SOQL/SOSL queries, CRUD operations, or Apex REST calls with the integration user's permissions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
CamelApplication
>= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Apache Camel versionLocate the Camel library JAR file in your application dependencies (pom.xml, build.gradle, or the lib/ directory) and note the version number, or run: mvn dependency:tree | grep camel-core or check your application startup logs for the Camel version bannerAffected if The installed version falls within >= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8; >= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3; or >= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0
-
Confirm Salesforce component is in useSearch your codebase for 'camel-salesforce' in dependencies (pom.xml, build.gradle) or look for routes using the 'salesforce:' URI scheme in your RouteBuilder Java/XML filesAffected if The camel-salesforce component is included as a dependency and routes use the salesforce endpoint
-
Determine if Salesforce endpoint accepts untrusted HTTP ingressInspect your Camel route configuration to see if the salesforce producer is exposed via an HTTP ingress (such as Servlet, Jetty, Undertow, or a REST DSL with HTTP binding) that accepts requests from untrusted network sourcesAffected if The salesforce endpoint is reachable via HTTP from sources outside your trusted network or without authentication validation at the ingress layer
-
Inspect header filtering configurationCheck your Camel route or Spring/Blueprint XML configuration for any HttpHeaderFilterStrategy bean or header filtering configuration, and identify which headers are allowed to pass through to the Salesforce producerAffected if The configuration does NOT explicitly filter out sObjectQuery, sObjectSearch, sObjectName, sObjectId, apexUrl, and apexMethod headers, or uses a filter that only removes Camel-prefixed headers
-
Check for unsafe header handling in route logicReview any custom Processor or Bean code that handles inbound HTTP headers before sending to the Salesforce endpoint, looking for direct header propagation without validationAffected if Code blindly copies or propagates HTTP headers (such as from ServletExchange, HttpMessage, or exchange.getIn().getHeaders()) to the Salesforce producer without filtering the control headers listed in the CVE
You are affected if you run a vulnerable Camel version with the Salesforce component exposed to untrusted HTTP ingress and the HttpHeaderFilterStrategy or custom code allows non-prefixed control headers (sObjectQuery, sObjectSearch, sObjectName, sObjectId, apexUrl, apexMethod) to pass through to the Salesforce producer.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for LTS 4.14.x, 4.18.3 for 4.18.x) and update code to use CamelSalesforce-prefixed header names; alternatively, strip sObject* and apex* headers from untrusted ingress before the salesforce producer.
4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS, 4.18.3 for 4.18.x)
- Upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS users, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x users)
- After upgrading, update all routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via raw header names to use the CamelSalesforce-prefixed names (e.g., CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery instead of sObjectQuery, CamelSalesforceApexUrl instead of apexUrl)
- Test the updated routes to ensure the header name changes work correctly
- For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, add removeHeaders('sObject*') and removeHeaders('apex*') at the start of any route that bridges an HTTP consumer to a salesforce: producer to strip untrusted ingress headers
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Camel
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,416.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-49099 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-49099 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data