Missing AuthorizationWeakness · CWE-862

CVE-2026-49291

HIGH · 8.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-19
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
87/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at `/mcp` requires only OAuth `read` scope for all requests, then dispatches `tools/call` directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call `store_memory` and `delete_memory` through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require `write` scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at /mcp requires only OAuth read scope for all requests, but then dispatches tools/call directly to handlers including mutating tools like store_memory and delete_memory. This allows read-only OAuth clients to bypass authorization and call these mutating operations via MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints correctly enforce write scope requirements.

MitigationUpgrade mcp-memory-service to version 10.65.3 or later which patches this authorization bypass. After upgrading, verify that OAuth read-scope clients can no longer invoke mutating MCP tools.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if MCP endpoint is enabled
    Check your server configuration or running services for the /mcp JSON-RPC endpoint exposure
    Affected if The /mcp endpoint is publicly or internally accessible and OAuth-protected
  2. Check OAuth scope configuration for MCP
    Inspect your OAuth configuration for the MCP endpoint to determine which scopes are being enforced - look for whether read and write scopes are differentiated
    Affected if The MCP endpoint accepts only 'read' scope for all requests including mutating operations
  3. Verify version against fixed release
    Locate the installed software version and compare to 10.65.3
    Affected if The installed version is earlier than 10.65.3
  4. Test read-only OAuth client access
    Use a client configured with only 'read' scope to call mutating MCP tools such as store_memory or delete_memory through the /mcp endpoint
    Affected if A read-only OAuth client can successfully invoke mutating tools through the MCP interface

You are affected if the /mcp JSON-RPC endpoint is enabled, accepts only 'read' scope for all operations, and the installed version is earlier than 10.65.3, allowing read-only OAuth clients to mutate data.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade mcp-memory-service to version 10.65.3 or later which patches this authorization bypass. After upgrading, verify that OAuth read-scope clients can no longer invoke mutating MCP tools.

Recommended fix High confidence

10.65.3

  1. 1. Identify the current version of mcp-memory-service in use
  2. 2. Upgrade mcp-memory-service to version 10.65.3 or later
  3. 3. Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the installed version
  4. 4. Confirm that OAuth read-only clients can no longer access mutating tools like store_memory and delete_memory through the MCP endpoint

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
7.0 hours of engineering $1,210
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,936.

Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-49291 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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