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Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)Weakness · CWE-918

CVE-2026-49345

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-06-19
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
59/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Mercator is an open source web application that enables mapping of the information system. Prior to version 2025.05.19, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Mercator's CVE configuration panel (`/admin/config/parameters`). The `testProvider()` method in `ConfigurationController` passes user-supplied input directly to `curl_init()` without validating the scheme, hostname, or destination IP address. An authenticated user with the `configure` permission can force the Mercator server to issue arbitrary outbound network requests. The suffix `/api/dbInfo` appended to the URL can be bypassed by injecting a `#` fragment character (e.g. `http://TARGET/PATH#`), allowing full control over the target URL. No scheme whitelist, host whitelist, or private/loopback IP block is applied. The `telnet://` scheme can be used for internal port scanning; the `gopher://` scheme enables interaction with unauthenticated internal services (Redis, Memcached), potentially leading to Remote Code Execution under specific deployment conditions. Version 2025.05.19 patches the issue.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

An SSRF vulnerability exists in Mercator's CVE configuration panel where the `testProvider()` method in `ConfigurationController` passes user-supplied URLs directly to `curl_init()` without validating the scheme, hostname, or destination IP. The `/api/dbInfo` suffix can be bypassed using a `#` fragment, and no protection exists against private/loopback IPs, allowing attackers to use `telnet://` for port scanning and `gopher://` to interact with internal services like Redis or Memcached for potential RCE.

MitigationUpgrade to version 2025.05.19 or later, which implements proper input validation including scheme whitelist, host/IP blocklisting, and handling of the fragment bypass.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if Mercator CVE configuration panel is installed
    Look for the Mercator application or CVE configuration panel in your environment - check for web application directories, installed packages, or the ConfigurationController component mentioned in the CVE.
    Affected if The Mercator CVE configuration panel is present in your environment
  2. Check the installed Mercator version
    Query your package manager, application metadata, or check the version information for your Mercator installation. Compare against the fixed version 2025.05.19.
    Affected if The installed version is lower than 2025.05.19
  3. Verify the /api/dbInfo endpoint exists and is accessible
    Check if the /api/dbInfo endpoint is available in your Mercator web application - this is the vulnerable endpoint containing the testProvider() method.
    Affected if The /api/dbInfo endpoint is accessible and responds to requests
  4. Confirm the testProvider() method is callable
    Attempt to interact with the CVE configuration panel functionality that uses testProvider() - this is where user-supplied URLs are passed to curl_init().
    Affected if The testProvider() functionality is accessible without authentication or with low-privileged access
  5. Check for lack of input validation on URL parameters
    Review any available logs, testing capabilities, or documentation to confirm whether user-supplied URLs can be submitted to the configuration panel without proper validation.
    Affected if User-supplied URLs can be submitted without scheme, hostname, or IP validation

You are affected if the Mercator CVE configuration panel is installed with a version lower than 2025.05.19 and the /api/dbInfo endpoint with testProvider() functionality is accessible.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to version 2025.05.19 or later, which implements proper input validation including scheme whitelist, host/IP blocklisting, and handling of the fragment bypass.

Recommended fix High confidence

2025.05.19

  1. Identify the Mercator installation and verify the currently installed version (likely via package.json, composer.json, or the application's about/admin panel)
  2. Confirm the current version is earlier than 2025.05.19, as versions prior to this contain the unpatched SSRF vulnerability
  3. Create a full backup of the Mercator application files and database before proceeding with the upgrade
  4. Upgrade Mercator to version 2025.05.19 or later, following the project's standard upgrade procedure (e.g., via git pull, package manager, or re-deployment)
  5. After upgrading, verify that the `/admin/config/parameters` endpoint no longer allows arbitrary URL schemes (test that telnet://, gopher://, and URL fragment bypasses are blocked)
  6. Confirm the testProvider() method now properly validates schemes, hostnames, and blocks private/loopback IP addresses before passing to curl_init()

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,440
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-49345 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data