CVE-2026-50182
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain an unauthenticated Reflected XSS vulnerability through AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination. The $_GET['search'] query parameter is concatenated directly into the href attribute of two pagination links in plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php (lines 67 and 74) with no htmlspecialchars, no urlencode, and no allow-list check. An injected <script> element is then extracted by the AVideo Layout plugin and concatenated into a single trailing inline script block at the bottom of the page, where the browser executes it. Any unauthenticated attacker can lure a victim into following a crafted URL to execute arbitrary JavaScript under the AVideo origin, which can read non-HttpOnly cookies and issue authenticated AJAX requests as the victim, and when the victim is an administrator, it can perform any cookie-authenticated admin action (create user, promote to admin, change configuration, install plugin), escalating a single click into full administrative takeover. This issue has been patched by this commit: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/f50fc033b7adb36f1ffd6640e7826468bdafdec3.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAVideo versions prior to 29.0 contain an unauthenticated reflected XSS in plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php where the $_GET['search'] parameter is directly concatenated into href attributes of pagination links (lines 67 and 74) without htmlspecialchars, urlencode, or allow-list filtering. When a victim clicks a crafted URL, the injected <script> tag is rendered in a trailing inline script block and executes under the AVideo origin.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed AVideo versionLocate the version number in your AVideo installation (check version file, admin dashboard, or footer)Affected if Version is prior to 29.0
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Confirm YouTubeAPI plugin existsVerify the plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php file exists in your AVideo installation directoryAffected if The gallerySection.php file is present in the YouTubeAPI plugin directory
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Inspect vulnerable code in gallerySection.phpOpen plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php and examine lines around 67 and 74 for direct concatenation of $_GET['search'] into href attributes without htmlspecialchars, urlencode, or allow-list filteringAffected if The $_GET['search'] parameter is used directly in href attributes without proper output encoding
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Check if plugin is accessibleAttempt to access a URL with the YouTubeAPI plugin path and a search parameter (for example: /plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php?search=test) to confirm the endpoint respondsAffected if The plugin endpoint is accessible and returns the page with the unencoded parameter in the response
You are affected if your AVideo version is earlier than 29.0 and the YouTubeAPI plugin with the vulnerable gallerySection.php file is installed and accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to AVideo version 29.0 or later, or apply the security patch from commit f50fc033b7adb36f1ffd6640e7826468bdafdec3 which adds proper output encoding to the search parameter.
29.0
- Upgrade AVideo to version 29.0 or later to receive the security fix
- After upgrading, verify that plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php no longer concatenates the 'search' GET parameter directly into href attributes without sanitization
- Confirm the fix by viewing the patched file at plugin/YouTubeAPI/gallerySection.php lines 67 and 74, ensuring htmlspecialchars or urlencode is now applied to the search parameter
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-50182 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-50182 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data