CVE-2026-5167
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Masteriyo LMS – Online Course Builder for eLearning, LMS & Education plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in versions up to and including 2.1.7. This is due to insufficient webhook signature verification in the handle_webhook() function. The webhook endpoint processes unauthenticated requests and only performs signature verification if both the webhook_secret setting is configured AND the HTTP_STRIPE_SIGNATURE header is present. Since webhook_secret defaults to an empty string, the webhook processes attacker-controlled JSON payloads without any verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send fake Stripe webhook events with arbitrary order_id values in the metadata, mark any order as completed without payment, and gain unauthorized access to paid course content.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Masteriyo LMS WordPress plugin has an authorization bypass vulnerability in its Stripe webhook handler. The handle_webhook() function only performs signature verification when BOTH a webhook_secret is configured AND the HTTP_STRIPE_SIGNATURE header is present. Since webhook_secret defaults to empty, unauthenticated attackers can send arbitrary JSON payloads to mark orders as completed without payment and access paid course content.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Masteriyo LMS plugin installationCheck the WordPress plugins directory or wp-content/plugins folder for the masteriyo directory, or query the wp_plugins database table for an entry named 'masteriyo' or 'LMS' by MasteriyoAffected if The plugin is not installed - no action needed; if installed, continue to next checks
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Identify the plugin versionRead the main plugin file (usually masteriyo.php or index.php in the masteriyo plugin folder) and locate the version definition, or query the wp_options table for the option_name containing 'masteriyo_version'Affected if Unable to determine version - treat as potentially affected and proceed with configuration checks
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Examine Stripe webhook configurationNavigate to the plugin settings in WordPress admin under Masteriyo settings, look for Stripe or payment settings, and check if webhook_secret is configured (not empty)Affected if webhook_secret field is empty or not set - the vulnerability is present because signature verification is bypassed by default
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Verify webhook endpoint accessibilityAccess the webhook endpoint URL (typically /?rest_route=/masteriyo/v1/stripe/webhook or similar under the WordPress site URL) and check if it responds, or check the plugin source code for webhook handler registrationAffected if The webhook endpoint is publicly accessible and responds to requests - combined with empty webhook_secret, the flaw is exploitable
A user is affected if the Masteriyo LMS plugin is installed with an empty or unconfigured webhook_secret in the Stripe settings, allowing unauthenticated webhook requests to be processed and potentially grant unauthorized access to premium content.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedConfigure a non-empty webhook_secret in the plugin settings and ensure signature verification occurs for all webhook requests, regardless of whether a secret is configured.
Version 2.1.8 or later
- 1. Navigate to the WordPress admin dashboard
- 2. Go to Plugins > Installed Plugins
- 3. Find Masteriyo LMS plugin
- 4. Check if an update is available (version 2.1.8 or later)
- 5. If update available, click 'Update Now' to upgrade to the patched version
- 6. After upgrading, navigate to Masteriyo LMS settings > Webhooks
- 7. Verify that a strong, non-empty webhook_secret is configured
- 8. Confirm the Stripe webhook endpoint is using the updated version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-5167 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-5167 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data