CVE-2026-5261
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was identified in Shandong Hoteam InforCenter PLM up to 8.3.8. The impacted element is the function uploadFileToIIS of the file /Base/BaseHandler.ashx. The manipulation of the argument File leads to unrestricted upload. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in Shandong Hoteam InforCenter PLM (versions up to 8.3.8) within the uploadFileToIIS function of /Base/BaseHandler.ashx. The function fails to properly validate uploaded file types, names, or content, allowing remote attackers to upload malicious files (such as web shells) to the server's web root.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Shandong Hoteam InforCenter PLM installationLocate the application installation directory - common paths may include C:\InforCenter\ or custom install paths. Check for the presence of InforCenter PLM application files and the BaseHandler.ashx file.Affected if The product is installed and the web application is accessible on the server.
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Check installed PLM versionExamine version information in the installation directory, typically found in a version.txt, about dialog, or assembly metadata within the web application's bin folder. Compare the version number to 8.3.8.Affected if The installed version is 8.3.8 or lower.
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Verify vulnerable handler existsLocate the file BaseHandler.ashx in the web application's Base directory. Check if the file exists at the web root path such as /Base/BaseHandler.ashx or within the application's URL structure.Affected if The BaseHandler.ashx file exists and is accessible via the web server.
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Check if upload functionality is enabledReview the BaseHandler.ashx configuration and code if accessible. Look for the uploadFileToIIS function and verify whether the upload endpoint is exposed and functional in the deployed application.Affected if The upload function in BaseHandler.ashx is accessible and processing requests.
If Shandong Hoteam InforCenter PLM version 8.3.8 or lower is installed with the BaseHandler.ashx upload functionality exposed, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImplement strict server-side file validation including allowlist-based file type checking, file content/magic byte verification, random filename generation, and restrict upload directories to prevent execution. Consider disabling script execution in upload directories.
- Disable the /Base/BaseHandler.ashx endpoint at the IIS/web server level if not required for business operations
- If the endpoint is required, implement IP allowlisting at the web application firewall or network level to restrict access to trusted IPs only
- Restrict file upload permissions for the IIS application pool identity to prevent execution of uploaded files
- Move the Shandong Hoteam InforCenter PLM system behind a VPN or private network with strict access controls
- Monitor web server logs for unusual upload activity to the BaseHandler.ashx endpoint
- Audit user accounts and remove unnecessary privileges to minimize attack surface
- Contact the vendor through alternative channels (phone, support portal with tracking number) and document the attempt to obtain a patch
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-5261 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-5261 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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