CVE-2026-52837
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedEasy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions up to and including 1.5.2, the booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe booking reschedule endpoint at /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} embeds the entire customer record from the ea_users table as inline JavaScript (const vars = {...}) without requiring authentication and without field whitelisting. The 12-character appointment_hash, exposed in reschedule emails and URLs, serves as the sole access control, allowing anyone with the hash to read all customer data columns.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Easy!Appointments installationLook for the presence of the Easy!Appointments application in the web root directory. Check for the typical file structure including index.php and the /includes/ or /application/ directories.Affected if The software is present on the server.
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Identify installed versionCheck the version.php file in the application directory, or look for a VERSION file in the root directory. Common paths include application/config/version.php or a VERSION file in the web root.Affected if The installed version is earlier than 1.6.0.
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Verify reschedule endpoint existsCheck if the endpoint /index.php/booking/reschedule/ is accessible by attempting to access it via HTTP request, or inspect the application routing configuration files to confirm the route exists.Affected if The reschedule endpoint is present and routable.
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Test for unauthenticated data exposureObtain a valid appointment hash from a reschedule email or URL (if you have a test account), then make an unauthenticated HTTP GET request to /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}. Inspect the response for inline JavaScript containing customer data variables (const vars = {...}) or raw customer record data from the ea_users table.Affected if The response returns customer data without requiring authentication.
A user is affected if Easy!Appointments version is below 1.6.0 and the reschedule endpoint returns customer data without authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Easy!Appointments version 1.6.0 or later which contains the patch for field whitelisting and authentication. As an interim measure, restrict network access to the reschedule endpoint.
1.6.0
- Plan and schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade
- Back up the Easy!Appointments database and all application files
- Download Easy!Appointments version 1.6.0 from the official repository
- Replace existing installation files with the new version 1.6.0 files
- Run any database migrations if required by the upgrade process
- Verify the application loads correctly and test booking functionality
- Confirm the reschedule endpoint at /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} no longer exposes full customer data
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-52837 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-52837 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data