CVE-2026-53447
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. Prior to 9.35, the Wekan cloneBoard Meteor method in models/import.js uses caller-supplied sourceBoardId to build a board export through models/exporter.js without invoking canExport() or checking source-board membership. Any authenticated user who knows a private board ID can clone the board into their own account and read its cards, comments, attachments, member information, and activities. This issue is fixed in version 9.35.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceWekan versions prior to 9.35 contain an IDOR vulnerability in the cloneBoard Meteor method. The method uses caller-supplied sourceBoardId without invoking canExport() or validating source-board membership, allowing any authenticated user to clone private boards they know the ID of and access all their content including cards, comments, attachments, and member info.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Wekan installation and versionCheck the Wekan application version. This is typically visible in the UI footer, in the About section, or by inspecting the server response headers. Alternatively, check the package.json, docker image tag, or the wekan_version file if self-hosted.Affected if The installed version is any version prior to 9.35 (e.g., 9.34, 9.30, 9.0, 8.x, etc.)
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Verify cloneBoard Meteor method is accessibleCheck if the WebSocket endpoint for Meteor methods is exposed. Use browser developer tools to monitor network traffic when interacting with Wekan, or examine the Meteor method definitions in the Wekan source code (packages/wekan-boards/ directory) for the presence of a cloneBoard function.Affected if The cloneBoard method exists and is callable without additional authorization checks in the code (prior to version 9.35).
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Confirm user authentication is possibleAttempt to log into the Wekan instance with any valid user account. Verify that authenticated sessions can invoke Meteor methods via DDP (Distributed Data Protocol).Affected if Any authenticated user (even without board membership) can access the cloneBoard method.
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Check for private boards that could be targetedEnumerate boards in the Wekan instance. Look for boards where the current user is NOT a member. The vulnerability allows cloning boards the user does not belong to, if the board ID is known.Affected if Private boards exist that the current user is not a member of, and the user knows or can guess the board ID.
You are affected if you are running any Wekan version prior to 9.35 and have private boards accessible via predictable IDs, because the cloneBoard method lacks authorization checks and can be invoked by any authenticated user.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Wekan to version 9.35 or later which adds proper authorization checks and canExport() validation to the cloneBoard method.
Wekan version 9.35 or later
- Backup your Wekan instance and database before proceeding with any upgrade
- Identify your current Wekan version (prior to 9.35) using your deployment method
- Upgrade Wekan to version 9.35 or later by following your existing deployment process (Docker, npm, or source)
- After upgrade, verify the cloneBoard method now properly checks board membership and calls canExport() before allowing clones
- Test that unauthenticated or non-member users can no longer clone private boards they don't have access to
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-53447 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-53447 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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