CVE-2026-54417
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn integer overflow in the mtar_next function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceInteger overflow in microtar 0.1.0's mtar_next() function allows a crafted tar archive to cause infinite loop/DoS. The function calculates record offset using 32-bit arithmetic as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t). When the header size field is 0xFFFFFE00-0xFFFFFC01, the addition wraps to 0, causing mtar_next() to seek to its current position instead of advancing, resulting in 100% CPU consumption with no recovery.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify microtar library versionSearch for microtar in your codebase or dependencies (check package.json, Cargo.toml, requirements.txt, go.mod, or similar dependency files). Look for microtar or mtar references and note the version number.Affected if Version is 0.1.0 (the only affected version per the CVE summary)
-
Locate the microtar source codeFind the microtar source files in your project (typically named microtar.c, microtar.h, or mtar.c). Open the source and look for the mtar_next function definition.Affected if The source file shows version 0.1.0 in comments/headers, or matches the vulnerable code pattern using 32-bit arithmetic for offset calculation.
-
Verify 32-bit arithmetic is usedIn the mtar_next function source, look for the record offset calculation pattern: round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t). Check if it uses 32-bit types (int, unsigned int, long) without 64-bit overflow protection.Affected if The calculation uses 32-bit types and lacks bounds checking before the addition, making integer overflow possible.
-
Identify tar processing code pathsSearch your codebase for calls to mtar_next(), mtar_open(), or mtar_read(). Determine if your application processes tar archives from untrusted sources (user uploads, network data, external files).Affected if Your code calls mtar_next() to iterate through tar archives, especially those from untrusted or user-supplied sources.
-
Check archive source trustReview where tar archives are loaded in your application. Determine if they originate from trusted internal sources or from untrusted external inputs (file uploads, API payloads, network downloads).Affected if Tar archives processed by microtar come from untrusted sources where an attacker could control the header size field.
You are affected if you use microtar version 0.1.0 and process tar archives from untrusted sources where an attacker can control the header size field to values between 0xFFFFFE00 and 0xFFFFFC01.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched version of microtar that implements proper bounds checking and 64-bit arithmetic for offset calculations, or add validation to reject tar archives where the size field would cause integer overflow.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-54417 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-54417 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data