CVE-2026-54769
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedLangroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Versions prior to 0.65.2 are vulnerable to a critical Sandbox Escape leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) in its `TableChatAgent` and `VectorStore` capabilities. When these agents evaluate LLM-generated tool messages with `full_eval=True`, they attempt to sandbox the execution by explicitly setting `locals` to an empty dictionary `{}` inside Python's `eval()` function. However, this relies on an incomplete understanding of Python's execution model. Because `__builtins__` is not explicitly scrubbed from the `globals` dictionary mapping, Python implicitly injects all built-ins during execution, granting full access to functions like `__import__('os').system()`. Since `TableChatAgent.pandas_eval()` executes external LLM outputs natively, this bypass permits any attacker providing prompt payload to achieve unauthenticated RCE on the host system. Version 0.65.2 patches the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceLangroid versions before 0.65.2 contain a sandbox escape vulnerability in TableChatAgent and VectorStore components. When these agents use eval() with full_eval=True and an empty locals dictionary to sandbox LLM-generated code, they fail to remove __builtins__ from the globals dictionary. Python implicitly includes all built-in functions, enabling attackers to call __import__('os').system() for unauthenticated remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Langroid versionRun `pip show langroid` or `python -c "import langroid; print(langroid.__version__)"` to retrieve the installed version numberAffected if The version is lower than 0.65.2
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Locate TableChatAgent usageSearch codebase for imports like `from langroid.agent.specialist.table_chat_agent import TableChatAgent` or direct usage of TableChatAgent classAffected if TableChatAgent is imported or instantiated in your code
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Locate VectorStore usageSearch codebase for imports like `from langroid.vector_store import ...` or instantiation of VectorStore-derived classesAffected if VectorStore component is imported or instantiated in your code
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Check full_eval configurationSearch for `full_eval=True` in your codebase, particularly in eval() calls within agent configuration or tool message handling codeAffected if full_eval=True is explicitly set or defaults to True in your agent setup
You are affected if you are running Langroid version below 0.65.2 AND using TableChatAgent or VectorStore with full_eval enabled, as this combination allows the unsafe eval() with unsanitized globals to execute.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Langroid to version 0.65.2 or later. If immediate patching is not possible, disable full_eval=True and implement input validation on LLM tool messages to prevent malicious payload injection.
langroid version 0.65.2
- 1. Identify the current version of Langroid in your project by checking your dependency files (e.g., requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, or poetry.lock)
- 2. Upgrade Langroid to version 0.65.2 or later by running: pip install langroid>=0.65.2 (or your equivalent package manager command)
- 3. Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the installed version: pip show langroid
- 4. If your project uses TableChatAgent or VectorStore capabilities, review your code to ensure you understand how eval() is being called - confirm the patch properly scrubs __builtins__ from globals
- 5. Test your application to ensure the upgrade does not break existing functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-54769 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-54769 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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