The CVSS 5.5 score on CVE-2026-55015 is misleading. The 'authorized attacker' qualifier doesn't narrow the risk — it redirects it into a channel that enterprise patch processes systematically underprioritize. That's the real vulnerability here: not the DLL hijacking itself, which is a well-understood pattern, but the organizational attention gap that the 'authorized user' framing creates.
Start by determining exactly which Active Directory groups or user roles grant Remote Help access. In most enterprise deployments, this isn't limited to IT staff — tier-1 support personnel, help desk contractors, and increasingly, end users authorized for self-service remote sessions all qualify. The blast radius isn't measured in CVSS points; it's measured in how many people lose the ability to call for help when the tool goes down.
The 'deny service' scope should be treated as provisional, not confirmed. When a DLL loads from an attacker-controlled path, the practical ceiling tends to reflect the tester's scope, not the exploitation boundary. Treat this as potentially escalable to code execution until proven otherwise, and adjust your response accordingly.
Your patch timeline should decouple from the CVSS number. Instead of matching the medium-severity cadence, align remediation with your help desk's operational criticality. If Remote Help is a choke point for incident response, a month-long patch delay isn't a moderate risk — it's a guarantee that the next help desk outage will be attributed to this vulnerability in hindsight. Audit your Remote Help deployment, restrict the user population to the minimum necessary, and instrument for anomalous process termination events that would indicate exploitation. The deprecation status of Remote Help, if accurate, should not reduce urgency — deprecated tools accumulate unpatched exposure precisely because attention migrates to successors that never arrive on schedule.