CVE-2026-5527
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA weakness has been identified in Tenda 4G03 Pro 1.0/1.0re/01.bin/04.03.01.53. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /etc/www/pem/server.key of the component ECDSA P-256 Private Key Handler. This manipulation causes use of hard-coded cryptographic key . It is possible to initiate the attack remotely.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Tenda 4G03 Pro router firmware contains a hard-coded ECDSA P-256 private key stored in /etc/www/pem/server.key. This hard-coded key is identical across all affected devices, allowing an attacker who obtains or derives the key to decrypt encrypted communications, impersonate the device, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks. The issue is remotely exploitable.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 04.03.01.53CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify device modelCheck if the device is a Tenda 4G03 Pro router. This may be visible on the device label, in the web interface, or via commands like 'cat /proc/cpuinfo' or 'nvram get device_name'Affected if The device is not a Tenda 4G03 Pro (not affected)
-
Check firmware versionDetermine the installed firmware version. This may be accessible via the web admin interface under System/Firmware info, or via command line such as 'cat /proc/version' or 'nvram get firmware_version'Affected if Firmware version is exactly 04.03.01.53 (affected). If version differs, compare to the affected range.
-
Locate the private key fileCheck if the file /etc/www/pem/server.key exists on the device. Use 'ls -la /etc/www/pem/server.key' or 'cat /etc/www/pem/server.key' if accessible via SSH/TelnetAffected if File /etc/www/pem/server.key does not exist (not affected)
-
Verify key type is ECDSA P-256Examine the key file content using 'openssl ec -in /etc/www/pem/server.key -text -noout' or similar to confirm it is an ECDSA P-256 private keyAffected if The file exists but is not an ECDSA P-256 key (not affected)
-
Confirm hard-coded key presenceIf the ECDSA P-256 private key exists at /etc/www/pem/server.key, this indicates the hard-coded key vulnerability. Compare the key against a known extracted key or check if multiple devices of the same model share identical keysAffected if An ECDSA P-256 private key is present at /etc/www/pem/server.key in firmware 04.03.01.53 (affected)
A defender is affected if they have a Tenda 4G03 Pro device running firmware version 04.03.01.53 that contains an ECDSA P-256 private key at /etc/www/pem/server.key.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the hard-coded private key with a unique, randomly generated key per device, and implement proper certificate management that allows certificate rotation. Users should regenerate or replace certificates on affected devices.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,968.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-5527 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-5527 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data