Resource Allocation Without LimitsWeakness · CWE-770

CVE-2026-55575

HIGH · 8.2 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-07-08
Patch available
A vendor patch is available. No clean upgrade release — apply the published patch.
See remediation →
91/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click Patch available 6 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.27.1, the pop array filter at src/filters/array.ts allocated a full clone of its input array via [...toArray(v)] without calling this.context.memoryLimit.use(...), allowing a template render such as {{ huge_array | pop }} to allocate an O(N) clone of an attacker-influenced array outside the configured memoryLimit budget. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.1.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

LiquidJS template engine prior to 10.27.1 has a memory limit bypass in the pop array filter. The filter clones the input array via spread operator `[...toArray(v)]` without using the configured memoryLimit context, allowing an attacker-controlled template to allocate O(N) copies of large arrays beyond the intended memory budget.

MitigationUpgrade LiquidJS to version 10.27.1 or later. Audit existing templates for user-influenced arrays passed to the pop filter.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify LiquidJS version
    Run `npm list liquidjs` or check package.json dependencies to find the installed version of LiquidJS
    Affected if Version is lower than 10.27.1 (e.g., 10.27.0, 10.26.0, etc.)
  2. Locate pop filter usage in templates
    Search template files (e.g., .liquid, .html with liquid tags) for occurrences of the `| pop` filter, especially in loops or with variable input
    Affected if Templates contain `| pop` filter applied to arrays that could be influenced by user input
  3. Verify memoryLimit configuration
    Check the LiquidJS initialization code for memoryLimit option (e.g., `new Liquid({ memoryLimit: ... })`)
    Affected if memoryLimit is configured but the pop filter implementation does not respect it (only verifiable by code review or testing large array inputs)
  4. Test pop filter with large arrays
    Create a test template using pop filter on a large array (e.g., array with 100k+ elements) and monitor memory consumption
    Affected if Memory usage grows beyond the configured memoryLimit when using the pop filter

You are affected if running LiquidJS version below 10.27.1 and your templates pass user-influenced arrays to the pop filter without memoryLimit protection.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Patch available Apply the vendor patch
Vendor patch github.com →
Interim mitigation

Upgrade LiquidJS to version 10.27.1 or later. Audit existing templates for user-influenced arrays passed to the pop filter.

Recommended fix High confidence

10.27.1

  1. Update the liquidjs package to version 10.27.1 or later using your package manager (e.g., npm install liquidjs@^10.27.1 or yarn add liquidjs@^10.27.1)
  2. Verify the fix by testing templates that use the pop filter with large arrays to confirm memoryLimit is properly enforced

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,970
Get the patch applied

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,152.

Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-55575 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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