dbcve.org
OS Command InjectionWeakness · CWE-78

CVE-2026-55576

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-07-15
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
97/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 5 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
MaaAssistantArknights is a one-click tool for daily Arknights tasks. In the current dev-v2 workflow, .github/workflows/release-preparation.yml inlined attacker-controlled github.event.pull_request.title into a run: shell command during the pull_request opened, reopened, and ready_for_review events, so a non-draft fork PR whose title starts with Release v could execute shell commands on the ubuntu-latest runner during the generate-changelog job. This vulnerability is fixed by commit cafc3946059e6337d2089d4fec8b6885ba17c332.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A command injection vulnerability exists in the GitHub Actions workflow release-preparation.yml where the pull request title (github.event.pull_request.title) is directly interpolated into a shell command without sanitization. Attackers can execute arbitrary shell commands on the CI runner by crafting a pull request title starting with 'Release v' followed by shell metacharacters.

MitigationMigrate to context inputs or environment files to safely pass pull_request.title to workflow steps, or implement strict allowlist validation on the title before using it in shell commands.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate the workflow file
    Search for release-preparation.yml in the repository, typically found in .github/workflows/ or similar CI configuration directories
    Affected if The file exists and contains GitHub Actions workflow definitions using pull request triggers
  2. Find pull request title usage
    Examine the workflow file for references to github.event.pull_request.title or ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
    Affected if The workflow references the pull request title from the event context
  3. Identify shell command interpolation
    Look for lines where the PR title variable is embedded directly into shell commands (run steps) without passing through input validation
    Affected if The PR title is used in a run step command without being assigned to an intermediate variable or validated first
  4. Check for command context
    Verify the workflow uses the PR title in a command context (bash -c, sh -c, or inline shell execution) rather than as a parameter
    Affected if The title is executed as part of a shell command or passed to a script that interprets it
  5. Look for sanitization
    Search for any validation, allowlisting, or sanitization logic applied to the PR title before shell execution (grep for 'if', 'contains', 'startsWith', or input validation patterns)
    Affected if No validation or sanitization exists on the pull request title before it is used in shell commands

The environment is affected if the repository contains a release-preparation.yml workflow that directly interpolates pull request titles into shell commands without validation, allowing attackers to inject shell metacharacters via crafted PR titles.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Migrate to context inputs or environment files to safely pass pull_request.title to workflow steps, or implement strict allowlist validation on the title before using it in shell commands.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Navigate to the MaaAssistantArknights repository.
  2. Check out the commit cafc3946059e6337d2089d4fec8b6885ba17c332 or pull the latest code to obtain the fixed workflow file.
  3. Alternatively, manually edit .github/workflows/release-preparation.yml to ensure that github.event.pull_request.title is not directly interpolated into a shell command without proper escaping or sanitization.

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,390
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-55576 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data