CVE-2026-56225
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCapgo before 12.128.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in its public API key management handlers (get/put/delete/post). API keys created with mode=all but restricted to a single app via limited_to_apps are only checked for limited_to_orgs and not for limited_to_apps, so an app-scoped key can enumerate, update, and delete sibling API keys belonging to the same account that are outside its declared app scope, enabling tampering with account-level credentials.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCapgo before 12.128.2 has an authorization bypass in its API key management endpoints (get/put/delete/post) where API keys created with mode=all but restricted to specific apps via limited_to_apps are only validated against limited_to_orgs checks, completely bypassing the limited_to_apps restriction. This allows an app-scoped API key to enumerate, update, and delete other API keys within the same account that are outside its declared app scope, enabling tampering with account-level credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check your Capgo versionLocate the installed Capgo version in your deployment (typically via package.json, Docker image tag, or the /api/health endpoint response). Compare it to the fixed version 12.128.2.Affected if The installed version is earlier than 12.128.2.
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Identify API keys with app restrictionsQuery your Capgo API key management system to list all API keys. For each key, examine the mode, limited_to_apps, and limited_to_orgs fields.Affected if You have API keys where mode=all and limited_to_apps contains specific app IDs, regardless of limited_to_orgs settings.
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Test key access beyond app scopeUsing an API key that has mode=all and limited_to_apps set to specific app(s), attempt to call the GET/POST/PUT/DELETE endpoints on /api/keys to list or modify API keys assigned to different apps within the same account.Affected if The key successfully retrieves, updates, or deletes API keys that are not in its declared limited_to_apps list.
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Verify org-only validationReview the API key authorization logic or logs to confirm that only limited_to_orgs is being checked while limited_to_apps is ignored for key management operations.Affected if The system permits API key operations based solely on org membership, bypassing app-level restrictions.
You are affected if your Capgo version is earlier than 12.128.2 AND you have API keys with mode=all that include limited_to_apps restrictions, as these keys can perform unauthorized operations on other keys outside their declared app scope.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Capgo version 12.128.2 or later which properly enforces limited_to_apps restrictions on API key operations.
Capgo version 12.128.2 or later
- 1. Identify the current Capgo installation version
- 2. If the current version is before 12.128.2, plan for an upgrade to version 12.128.2 or later
- 3. Before upgrading, backup the current configuration and database
- 4. Upgrade Capgo to version 12.128.2 or the latest stable release
- 5. After upgrade, verify that API keys with limited_to_apps restrictions now properly enforce app-scoped access
- 6. Review API key permissions to ensure no unauthorized access has occurred
- 7. Monitor for any anomalous API key operations
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-56225 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-56225 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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