CVE-2026-56231
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCapgo before 12.128.2 contains a broken object level authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in the POST /build/start/:jobId and POST /build/cancel/:jobId endpoints. The handlers authorize the request based only on the attacker-controlled app_id supplied in the request body and never verify that the jobId in the URL belongs to that app_id (or the same tenant/org) before issuing privileged builder commands with the server-held builder API key. An authenticated user with the app.build_native permission for any app they control can start or cancel arbitrary builder jobs belonging to other tenants by supplying a victim jobId, resulting in cross-tenant build sabotage (denial of service), unauthorized compute actions, and potential billing impact.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in Capgo's build API endpoints. The /build/start/:jobId and /build/cancel/:jobId endpoints authorize requests based solely on an attacker-controlled app_id in the request body without validating that the jobId belongs to that app_id or tenant. This allows authenticated users to manipulate build jobs belonging to other tenants by supplying arbitrary jobIds, enabling cross-tenant build sabotage and unauthorized compute actions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Capgo versionCheck the installed Capgo version by reviewing package.json, package-lock.json, or running 'capgo --version' or checking the admin dashboard version displayAffected if Version is below 12.128.2 (any version < 12.128.2 is affected)
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Verify build API endpoint exposureReview API routing configuration or server logs to confirm endpoints /build/start/:jobId and /build/cancel/:jobId are registered and accessibleAffected if These build job control endpoints are exposed in the API surface
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Inspect tenant isolation in build endpointsExamine the source code or API gateway configuration for the /build/start/:jobId and /build/cancel/:jobId route handlers, specifically looking for server-side validation that confirms the jobId belongs to the authenticated user's tenant before processing the requestAffected if No server-side tenant/owner validation exists for jobId in these endpoints, or validation relies only on app_id from request body
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Test cross-tenant access controlIf you have test environments, authenticate as User A (tenant A), obtain a valid jobId belonging to tenant B, and attempt to call /build/start/:jobId or /build/cancel/:jobId with tenant B's jobId while providing tenant A's app_id in the request bodyAffected if The request succeeds or returns a 2xx response, indicating the authorization check is bypassed
Your environment is affected if Capgo version is below 12.128.2 AND the build API endpoints are exposed, especially if tenant validation for jobId is missing or relies solely on client-provided app_id.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Capgo 12.128.2 or later, and implement proper server-side validation that verifies the jobId in the URL belongs to the same tenant/organization as the authenticated user before executing builder commands.
12.128.2 or later
- 1. Identify the current version of Capgo installed in your environment
- 2. Upgrade Capgo to version 12.128.2 or later to address the BOLA vulnerability
- 3. After upgrading, verify that the /build/start/:jobId and /build/cancel/:jobId endpoints now properly validate that the jobId belongs to the requested app_id/tenant before executing builder commands
- 4. Test the fix by attempting to start/cancel a build job from one app using a jobId from a different app - this should now be rejected with an authorization error
- 5. Monitor for any unexpected behavior and review access logs to confirm the authorization checks are functioning correctly
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-56231 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-56231 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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