CVE-2026-56345
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint derives the target users_id directly from the uploaded filename without server-side validation or authorization checks. An attacker with the Meet shared secret can craft filenames like '1-anything.mp4' to trigger passwordless User->login() as any user, enabling full account takeover including admin privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Meet plugin is installedCheck for the presence of the Meet plugin directory or configuration files in your application (e.g., look for 'meet', 'jitsi', or video conferencing related plugins/modules in your plugin or module directory)Affected if The Meet plugin is installed and enabled on the system
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Locate the vulnerable upload endpointCheck for the existence of uploadRecordedVideo.json.php in the Meet plugin directory (typically at /path/to/meet/uploadRecordedVideo.json.php)Affected if The file uploadRecordedVideo.json.php exists in the Meet plugin
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Verify Meet shared secret configurationCheck your Meet plugin configuration for a shared secret setting (often named 'sharedSecret', 'secret', or similar in the plugin config file or database)Affected if A Meet shared secret is configured and in use
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Test endpoint for users_id validationAttempt to access or probe the uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint with a crafted filename containing a different users_id (e.g., '2-anything.mp4' when you are not user 2) and observe if the system accepts it without validating against your sessionAffected if The endpoint accepts filenames with arbitrary users_id values without server-side session validation
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Confirm authentication bypass capabilityVerify that using a crafted filename like '1-admin-username.mp4' against the upload endpoint can trigger a login as that user without providing valid credentialsAffected if The endpoint allows passwordless login as arbitrary users by embedding their users_id in the filename
If the Meet plugin is installed with a configured shared secret and the uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint accepts filenames containing arbitrary users_id values without validating them against the authenticated session, the environment is affected by this CVE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement server-side validation ensuring the users_id in the filename matches the authenticated user's session ID, and require proper authorization checks before allowing video uploads. Additionally, rotate the Meet shared secret and remediate the path-traversal/timing attack vulnerabilities in checkToken.json.php.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-56345 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-56345 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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