CVE-2026-56380 exposes creator email addresses through AVideo's RSS feeds via the itunes:email and itunes:author fields. These fields were copied from podcast RSS conventions to achieve iTunes compatibility, but a video platform's RSS feed serves a fundamentally different access context than a podcast feed—video platform feeds are consumed by general-purpose aggregators, search indexers, and content syndication tools, not a narrow podcast discovery ecosystem. The email field landed in a public-facing export channel without any access control classification, and the RSS endpoint has no rate limiting or authentication layer. The enumeration mechanism is trivially simple: iterate channel names, fetch the RSS, parse the XML, extract the email. This isn't a sophisticated attack—it's a design failure where the RSS pipeline was treated as a display concern rather than an API with security implications. The itunes:email field is likely deprecated integration—iTunes podcast compatibility has likely decayed as a priority for AVideo, yet the data exposure persists undiminished. Check your AVideo instance's RSS feed for itunes:email and itunes:author fields immediately. More importantly, audit what other metadata fields flow into your RSS and API export channels without access control classification. The pattern here—fields added for external compatibility requirements being treated as inert metadata—is a known class of failure in content management systems. This vulnerability likely existed for years before discovery given how trivially it enumerates. If your instance hasn't patched, treat any creator email harvested from your RSS feeds as compromised and monitor for targeted phishing or password reset attempts against those accounts. The fix likely removed these two fields, but the deeper question is whether AVideo has established a data classification layer that would catch the next unclassified sensitive field before it reaches an unauthenticated endpoint.
CVE-2026-56380
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an information exposure vulnerability in feed/index.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to retrieve channel owner email addresses by supplying a public channel name parameter. Attackers can enumerate all creator email addresses by iterating through public channel names and extract them from the itunes:email and itunes:author RSS elements, enabling account takeover attempts and phishing campaigns.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe application discloses data — error detail, internal paths, tokens, or other users' records — to someone who shouldn't see it. On its own it can look minor, but it hands attackers the map they need for a larger attack. Remediation is about minimising what's returned and enforcing authorization on every piece of data.
General guidance for the information exposure class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThere is no version to upgrade to and no patch to apply. Every affected install stays exposed until the vendor ships a fix — or somebody else builds one.
Free. We build fixes in the order the community asks for them — and we’ll tell you the moment this one lands.
We develop and verify an original fix where the vendor hasn’t, from $2,200. Deployed to your staging first — never straight to production.
Scope it with usSee what else the community needs solved on the solutions-needed board.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-56380 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesCVE-2026-56380 exposes creator email addresses through AVideo's RSS feeds via the itunes:email and itunes:author fields. These fields were copied from podcast RSS conventions to achieve iTunes compatibility, but a video platform's RSS feed serves a fundamentally different access context than a podcast feed—video platform feeds are consumed by general-purpose aggregators, search indexers, and content syndication tools, not a narrow podcast discovery ecosystem. The email field landed in a public-facing export channel without any access control classification, and the RSS endpoint has no rate limiting or authentication layer. The enumeration mechanism is trivially simple: iterate channel names, fetch the RSS, parse the XML, extract the email. This isn't a sophisticated attack—it's a design failure where the RSS pipeline was treated as a display concern rather than an API with security implications. The itunes:email field is likely deprecated integration—iTunes podcast compatibility has likely decayed as a priority for AVideo, yet the data exposure persists undiminished. Check your AVideo instance's RSS feed for itunes:email and itunes:author fields immediately. More importantly, audit what other metadata fields flow into your RSS and API export channels without access control classification. The pattern here—fields added for external compatibility requirements being treated as inert metadata—is a known class of failure in content management systems. This vulnerability likely existed for years before discovery given how trivially it enumerates. If your instance hasn't patched, treat any creator email harvested from your RSS feeds as compromised and monitor for targeted phishing or password reset attempts against those accounts. The fix likely removed these two fields, but the deeper question is whether AVideo has established a data classification layer that would catch the next unclassified sensitive field before it reaches an unauthenticated endpoint.
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-56380 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data