CVE-2026-56678
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · unedited9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, the Kiro API-key validation endpoint POST /api/oauth/kiro/api-key builds an upstream URL using a user-controlled region value, allowing an authenticated attacker to supply a crafted region such as kiro-canary.local:8443# and cause 9Router to send the Kiro validation request to an attacker-controlled host while forwarding the submitted Kiro API key as an Authorization header. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Kiro API-key validation endpoint POST /api/oauth/kiro/api-key constructs an upstream URL using a user-controlled region parameter without proper validation. An authenticated attacker can supply a crafted region value (e.g., kiro-canary.local:8443#) to redirect the validation request to an attacker-controlled server while forwarding the submitted Kiro API key as an Authorization header, resulting in SSRF with credential theft.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Kiro API is deployedSearch for Kiro API service files, Docker containers, or running processes named 'kiro'. Check for any /api/oauth/kiro/api-key endpoint exposure in your API gateway or reverse proxy logs.Affected if Kiro API service is found running in the environment
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Determine installed Kiro versionCheck the Kiro service version via its binary (kiro --version), Docker image tag, or package manager. Compare against the fixed version 0.5.6.Affected if Installed version is lower than 0.5.6 or version cannot be determined
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Verify the vulnerable endpoint existsConfirm POST /api/oauth/kiro/api-key is accessible by checking your API routing configuration, OpenAPI specs, or by sending a test request to the endpoint (may require authentication).Affected if The /api/oauth/kiro/api-key endpoint is exposed and reachable
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Inspect region parameter validationReview the Kiro API source code or configuration for how the 'region' parameter in the /api/oauth/kiro/api-key endpoint is validated. Look for allowlist logic that restricts region values.Affected if No strict allowlist validation exists for the region parameter, or validation can be bypassed
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Check for suspicious outbound requestsReview network logs, proxy logs, or API gateway logs for requests from the Kiro API server to unusual external hosts, particularly on ports 8443 or 443, with paths containing 'kiro-' or suspicious domains.Affected if Outbound requests from Kiro API are observed to unknown external domains, especially with the API key in Authorization headers
The environment is affected if Kiro API with version lower than 0.5.6 is deployed and the /api/oauth/kiro/api-key endpoint is accessible without strict region parameter allowlist validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 0.5.6 or later. As a compensating control, implement strict allowlist validation for the region parameter to only permit legitimate region values.
0.5.6
- Upgrade 9Router to version 0.5.6 or later to remediate the improper input validation vulnerability in the Kiro API-key validation endpoint
- After upgrading, verify that the Kiro API-key validation functionality still works correctly
- Review any custom configurations related to the region parameter to ensure compatibility with the fixed version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-56678 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-56678 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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