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CWE-129Weakness · CWE-129

CVE-2026-57268

HIGH · 8.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-02
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
90/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges 8 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
GeoWebPlayer (also called "Web Plugin" in the GV-VMS documentation and "WS Player" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly. The Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an `index` value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the `index` value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound. ### saveVideo command index-out-of-bound When sending the `saveVideo` command, the `index` field is extracted from the websocket message [1]. Then without checking the range of the index, it is used to trigger a CriticalSection ([2]) and releases it [3]. The release function call ([3]) is executed using a function pointer which will be read out of bounds potentially leading to code execution: v6 = get_entry(a2, "index"); result = json_is_value_int(v6); if ( (_BYTE)result ) { v8 = get_entry(a2, "index"); index = json_value_to_int(&v8->value); // [1] result = CCriticalSection::EnterCritSection(&this->crit_sections[index]); //[2] if ( result ) { if ( this->array_of_IPCams[index] ) { if ( this->array_of_IPCams[index]->field_20 ) do_PostMessageA((CViewer *)this->array_of_IPCams[index], 0x111u, 0x139Fu, v11); } return (*(int (__thiscall **)(CCriticalSection *))(this->crit_sections[index].vtbl + 20))(&this->crit_sections[index]); //[3] } }

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

GeoWebPlayer websocket server accepts commands with an 'index' parameter that is used to access arrays without validating the index range. In the saveVideo command, the unchecked index accesses crit_sections array, and a subsequent function pointer call from vtable offset reads from out-of-bounds memory, potentially enabling code execution.

MitigationAdd bounds validation on all index values before array access in websocket command handlers. Restrict websocket server access to trusted localhost processes until a vendor patch is available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify GeoWebPlayer installation
    Locate GeoWebPlayer binaries or services on the system. Common locations may include /opt/, /usr/local/, or as a Windows service. Check for processes named geowebplayer or websocket-related executables.
    Affected if GeoWebPlayer is installed and running
  2. Verify websocket server is enabled
    Inspect GeoWebPlayer configuration files for websocket server settings. Check if the websocket listener is bound to a network interface (0.0.0.0) rather than localhost only (127.0.0.1).
    Affected if The websocket server is exposed on a non-localhost network interface
  3. Check installed version
    Run: geowebplayer --version or inspect the binary metadata for version information. Compare against any published version numbers.
    Affected if The installed version matches the affected version range for this CVE
  4. Confirm saveVideo command accessibility
    If websocket server is accessible, verify the saveVideo command endpoint exists by reviewing the application's command handlers or sending a test JSON message with the saveVideo command.
    Affected if The saveVideo command handler is present and accepts websocket JSON input
  5. Assess network exposure
    Use netstat or ss to check which addresses the GeoWebPlayer websocket port (commonly 8080 or 9000) is listening on. Confirm if it accepts connections from untrusted sources.
    Affected if The websocket server accepts connections from non-trusted or remote hosts

A user is affected if GeoWebPlayer with the vulnerable websocket server is running and accessible from untrusted network sources, and the installed version falls within the affected range.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Add bounds validation on all index values before array access in websocket command handlers. Restrict websocket server access to trusted localhost processes until a vendor patch is available.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
25.0 hours of engineering $4,400
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-57268 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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