CVE-2026-57270
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGeoWebPlayer (also called "Web Plugin" in the GV-VMS documentation and "WS Player" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly. The Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an `index` value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the `index` value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound. #### play command index-out-of-bound
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceGeoWebPlayer websocket server does not validate the 'index' parameter before using it to access arrays in memory. When the 'play' command (and potentially others) receives an index value, it directly uses this value to access array elements without bounds checking, allowing an attacker to read or write beyond array boundaries. This can lead to information disclosure, denial of service, or potentially code execution depending on what data lies adjacent to the affected arrays.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Determine if GeoWebPlayer is installedSearch for GeoWebPlayer processes or binaries on the system using commands like 'ps aux | grep -i geoweb' or 'find / -name *geoweb*'Affected if GeoWebPlayer software is found running on the system
-
Check if websocket server is listeningUse netstat or ss to inspect listening ports (common websocket ports: 8080, 9090) or examine GeoWebPlayer configuration for websocket server enablementAffected if The GeoWebPlayer websocket server is bound to a network interface and accepting connections
-
Verify websocket access controlsExamine GeoWebPlayer configuration files for websocket server binding settings (look for bind address or allowed hosts settings)Affected if Websocket server is bound to a non-localhost interface (0.0.0.0) or accessible from remote hosts
-
Identify websocket command exposureReview GeoWebPlayer documentation or configuration to confirm if the 'play' command and other websocket handlers are enabled and accessibleAffected if The 'play' command or other websocket command handlers are exposed and callable by clients
-
Check for version informationQuery the installed GeoWebPlayer version using 'geowebplayer --version', examining binary metadata, or checking package manager recordsAffected if The installed version matches or falls within an affected version range (compare against vendor advisory)
A user is affected if GeoWebPlayer is running with its websocket server exposed and the 'play' command is accessible without proper input validation on index parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement rigorous bounds checking on all index parameters before array access in the websocket command handlers. Restrict websocket server access to trusted localhost sources only as an interim defense-in-depth measure until the patch is applied.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-57270 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-57270 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data