CVE-2026-57275
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGeoWebPlayer (also called "Web Plugin" in the GV-VMS documentation and "WS Player" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly. The Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. One of them, `connectionInfo` is meant to provide the necessary details to connect to a camera. The handler associated with this command that we call`handle_connection_info` contains multiple instances of string copy that can overflow. The function `handle_connect_info` copies attacker-controlled JSON strings into fixed-size buffers using manual byte-by-byte loops that do not enforce length limits. #### Buffer Overflow in username field (key present)
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceBuffer overflow in GeoWebPlayer websocket server's handle_connection_info function where manual byte-by-byte string copy loops copy attacker-controlled JSON values into fixed-size buffers without length validation, allowing overflow of adjacent memory.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm GeoWebPlayer installationLocate GeoWebPlayer installation directory and identify executable files (geowebplayer, geowebplayer.exe, or similar). Check for process running on common websocket ports (typically 8080, 8443, or configurable).Affected if GeoWebPlayer websocket server is not installed or not running
-
Determine GeoWebPlayer versionRun 'geowebplayer --version' or check version info in application metadata, license files, or binary properties. Compare against any available version information from vendor release notes.Affected if Installed version matches or falls within an affected version range (if known)
-
Verify websocket server is enabledCheck configuration files (geowebplayer.conf, config.xml, settings.json) for websocket server settings. Confirm the 'enable_websocket' or 'ws_server' option is set to true or the server is bound to an active port.Affected if Websocket server is enabled and listening on a network interface
-
Check network exposure of websocket interfaceReview network binding configuration. Inspect config files for 'bind_address', 'host', or 'listen' settings. Use 'netstat -an | grep <websocket_port>' or 'ss -tlnp | grep <port>' to confirm which interfaces the websocket binds to.Affected if Websocket server binds to 0.0.0.0 or non-localhost IP, exposing it to network attackers
-
Inspect handle_connection_info function exposureIdentify if the handle_connection_info endpoint is reachable via /ws, /websocket, or similar path. Test with a benign WebSocket connection request to the server and examine if JSON-based connection_info messages are accepted.Affected if Websocket endpoint accepts JSON connection_info messages without prior authentication or access restrictions
A user is affected if GeoWebPlayer with an exposed websocket server is running and accepts unauthenticated JSON connection_info messages on a non-localhost interface.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict access to the localhost websocket interface; implement proper length bounds checking and use safe string functions (e.g., strncpy, snprintf) with explicit length limits on all string copy operations before buffer assignment.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,968.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-57275 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-57275 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data