CVE-2026-57536
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOur payment integration with Mollie did not properly validate payment status responses. An attacker could use a successful payment status response from one payment and supply it to the system for a different payment, gaining access to multiple valid tickets with only one payment.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Mollie payment integration fails to validate that payment status responses are tied to the specific payment session or order. An attacker can intercept or reuse a successful payment response from one transaction and replay it against a different order/ticket, obtaining multiple valid tickets while only paying once.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Mollie payment integration is enabledReview your application configuration files or admin settings for any active Mollie payment module, plugin, or API integrationAffected if Mollie payment processing is actively configured or in use
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Locate payment status callback handlerSearch your codebase for Mollie webhook or payment status callback endpoints (often paths containing 'mollie', 'payment', 'webhook', or 'callback')Affected if A Mollie payment callback handler exists in the application
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Inspect payment response validation logicExamine the callback handler code to verify whether it validates that the payment reference/mollie_id in the response matches the order_id or session_id that initiated the payment requestAffected if The code does NOT validate that the payment response is tied to the specific order being processed (no order ID or session binding check)
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Check for replay attack mitigationLook for whether the system checks if a payment status has already been processed (e.g., database record of processed payment IDs) before issuing tickets or completing ordersAffected if There is no mechanism to prevent reusing the same payment response for multiple orders
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Verify order-ticket binding in fulfillmentExamine the code that issues tickets or completes orders after payment confirmation to see if it independently verifies the order ID matches the paymentAffected if Tickets or orders are issued based solely on receiving a 'paid' status without confirming the order ID in the payment response
You are affected if your system uses Mollie payment integration and processes payment status responses without validating that each response is tied to the specific order/session being fulfilled, allowing replay of payment statuses across different orders.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement cryptographic binding between payment status responses and the specific order/ticket ID being processed, validating that the payment reference in the response matches the original payment request.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,888.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-57536 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-57536 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data