CVE-2026-57999
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedluci-app-tailscale-community contains a command injection vulnerability in the tailscale.do_login RPC method that allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands as root. The vulnerability exists because user-controlled loginserver and loginserver_authkey parameters are improperly quoted within a double-quoted shell command, allowing shell substitutions like $() to be evaluated by the outer shell before argument processing.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in the tailscale.do_login RPC method of luci-app-tailscale-community where the loginserver and loginserver_authkey parameters are embedded into a double-quoted shell command without proper sanitization. The double-quoting allows $() shell substitution, enabling authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify luci-app-tailscale-community is installedOn the OpenWrt/LEDE router, run 'opkg list-installed | grep luci-app-tailscale' or check via LuCI System > Software interfaceAffected if The package appears in the installed list
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Determine the installed versionRun 'opkg info luci-app-tailscale-community | grep Version' to retrieve the exact version numberAffected if Version cannot be determined or is earlier than any patched release
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Confirm tailscale RPC interface is enabledCheck UCI configuration: look for 'config tailscale' section in /etc/config/tailscale or /etc/config/luci_tailscale, verify the 'rpc' or 'api' option is set to '1' or enabledAffected if The RPC interface is enabled and accessible remotely or via the web interface
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Verify the do_login RPC method is exposedTest for the existence of the tailscale.do_login method by examining the LuCI RPC router configuration or by querying the JSON-RPC endpoint at /cgi-bin/luci/rpc/tailscale with an empty auth payload to enumerate available methodsAffected if The do_login method is listed as an available RPC method
A system is affected if luci-app-tailscale-community is installed with its RPC interface enabled, allowing external access to the vulnerable tailscale.do_login method with controllable loginserver or loginserver_authkey parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation to strip or reject shell metacharacters ($(), |, &, ;, etc.) from the loginserver and loginserver_authkey parameters, and use safe argument passing methods instead of shell string interpolation.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-57999 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-57999 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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