CVE-2026-58166
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOpenBMB ChatDev through 2.2.0, fixed in commit 4fd4da6, contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to write or delete arbitrary files by supplying a malicious multipart filename in the file upload endpoint. Attackers can send a crafted filename containing path traversal sequences or an absolute path to the POST uploads session endpoint, which constructs the destination path without sanitization in save_upload_file, causing file write and cleanup operations to target attacker-chosen paths on the server filesystem.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisA file path is built from user input without being confined, so sequences like “../” let an attacker step outside the intended directory. That can expose configuration, credentials, or source code, and in the worst case lets an attacker write files where they shouldn't. A durable fix resolves and canonicalises the path, then rejects anything that escapes a known-safe base directory.
General guidance for the path traversal class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped- 1. Navigate to the ChatDev repository: https://github.com/OpenBMB/ChatDev
- 2. Locate the commit that contains the security fix: 4fd4da603801766b14ad8788649cfc1ad21f99a6
- 3. Review the diff to understand the path sanitization changes made to the save_upload_file function in the file upload endpoint
- 4. Apply the patch to your local installation by either cherry-picking the commit or manually implementing the path validation logic
- 5. Verify that uploaded filenames are properly sanitized - ensure the code validates and normalizes file paths to prevent path traversal sequences like '../' or absolute paths
- 6. Test the file upload functionality to confirm legitimate uploads still work correctly after applying the fix
- 7. Restart the ChatDev service to ensure the patched code is active
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-58166 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-58166 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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