CVE-2026-62752 is a heap-based buffer overflow in a Windows Kerberos authentication component, carrying a CVSS of 7.8 and an EPSS score of 0.00318. The EPSS number is the right starting point for triage: this is not a weaponized n-day demanding emergency patching. However, treating the CVSS as a standalone urgency signal will misguide your response. The vulnerability requires an 'authorized attacker' to have already compromised a domain account and achieved local code execution — but that qualifier encodes a dangerous assumption that has failed repeatedly in Kerberos vulnerabilities: that credentials imply trustworthy input. The heap overflow lives in code that processes Kerberos ticket fields, PAC data, or session key material. Once an attacker has any foothold as a domain user — and in enterprise environments, that includes CI/CD pipelines, service accounts, and monitoring agents running as domain accounts — the local privilege escalation becomes immediately actionable. The historical pattern is telling. Microsoft has patched Kerberos PAC parsing heap overflows at regular intervals: CVE-2014-6324, CVE-2020-1701, CVE-2020-1699. Red teams operationalized each within weeks, not because the 'prior access' requirement was easy to meet, but because the 'prior access' prerequisite collapses cheaply through phishing, credential stuffing, and service account compromise. Heap overflows in authentication code paths have a higher reliability-to-exploit ratio than EPSS captures. The exploitation conditions are controlled — you're already in a code path validated to process the exact data structure you control, without the ASLR bypass complexity required against browser targets. What should you actually do? First, treat this as a priority-two patch in your 30-to-60-day cycle rather than a fire drill. Second, examine your environment for domain-joined systems running as domain users — those are your one-hop escalation targets. Third, and more importantly, recognize that this CVE joins a pattern of recurring Kerberos PAC parsing flaws in code that hasn't been meaningfully audited in decades. The 'authorized attacker' qualifier keeps being redefined by attackers demonstrating they can meet it cheaply. Your monitoring posture should account for the compounding risk: multiple disclosed-but-unpatched Kerberos flaws in your estate increase the probability that a phishing-derived foothold finds a reliable chain to domain privilege escalation. EPSG gives you a point-in-time probability for this specific vulnerability. It does not give you the probability that this flaw, combined with unpatched Kerberos CVEs already present in your environment, creates an exploitation chain. That's the number that should inform your prioritization, and it's higher than the EPSS score alone suggests.
CVE-2026-62752
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHeap-based buffer overflow in Windows Kerberos allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
In the news
Third-party coverageSurfaced from public web coverage — external links open in a new tab.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisData overflows a buffer allocated on the heap, corrupting neighbouring heap structures and allocator metadata that a patient attacker can groom into control of execution. It is subtler than a stack overflow but just as dangerous. The fix is validating lengths before every write and using safe allocators and bounded operations.
General guidance for the heap-based buffer overflow class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 10.0.14393.9418< 10.0.17763.9115< 10.0.19044.7663< 10.0.19045.7663< 10.0.22631.7517< 10.0.26100.9106< 10.0.26200.9106< 10.0.28000.2704CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data10.0.14393.941810.0.17763.911510.0.19044.7663
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-62752 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesCVE-2026-62752 is a heap-based buffer overflow in a Windows Kerberos authentication component, carrying a CVSS of 7.8 and an EPSS score of 0.00318. The EPSS number is the right starting point for triage: this is not a weaponized n-day demanding emergency patching. However, treating the CVSS as a standalone urgency signal will misguide your response. The vulnerability requires an 'authorized attacker' to have already compromised a domain account and achieved local code execution — but that qualifier encodes a dangerous assumption that has failed repeatedly in Kerberos vulnerabilities: that credentials imply trustworthy input. The heap overflow lives in code that processes Kerberos ticket fields, PAC data, or session key material. Once an attacker has any foothold as a domain user — and in enterprise environments, that includes CI/CD pipelines, service accounts, and monitoring agents running as domain accounts — the local privilege escalation becomes immediately actionable. The historical pattern is telling. Microsoft has patched Kerberos PAC parsing heap overflows at regular intervals: CVE-2014-6324, CVE-2020-1701, CVE-2020-1699. Red teams operationalized each within weeks, not because the 'prior access' requirement was easy to meet, but because the 'prior access' prerequisite collapses cheaply through phishing, credential stuffing, and service account compromise. Heap overflows in authentication code paths have a higher reliability-to-exploit ratio than EPSS captures. The exploitation conditions are controlled — you're already in a code path validated to process the exact data structure you control, without the ASLR bypass complexity required against browser targets. What should you actually do? First, treat this as a priority-two patch in your 30-to-60-day cycle rather than a fire drill. Second, examine your environment for domain-joined systems running as domain users — those are your one-hop escalation targets. Third, and more importantly, recognize that this CVE joins a pattern of recurring Kerberos PAC parsing flaws in code that hasn't been meaningfully audited in decades. The 'authorized attacker' qualifier keeps being redefined by attackers demonstrating they can meet it cheaply. Your monitoring posture should account for the compounding risk: multiple disclosed-but-unpatched Kerberos flaws in your estate increase the probability that a phishing-derived foothold finds a reliable chain to domain privilege escalation. EPSG gives you a point-in-time probability for this specific vulnerability. It does not give you the probability that this flaw, combined with unpatched Kerberos CVEs already present in your environment, creates an exploitation chain. That's the number that should inform your prioritization, and it's higher than the EPSS score alone suggests.
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-62752 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data