CVE-2026-6496
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was found in prasathmani TinyFileManager up to 2.6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /filemanager.php of the component POST Parameter Handler. The manipulation of the argument file[] results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePath traversal vulnerability in TinyFileManager's /filemanager.php via the file[] POST parameter allows remote attackers to access files outside the intended directory by manipulating the argument with directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../etc/passwd).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm TinyFileManager installationSearch for 'filemanager.php' or 'tinyfilemanager.php' in the web root directory using file system inspection (e.g., find /var/www -name '*filemanager*.php' 2>/dev/null) or check web server configuration for references to TinyFileManager.Affected if TinyFileManager's filemanager.php file exists and is accessible via the web server.
-
Identify TinyFileManager versionOpen the filemanager.php file and search for a version string (often in comments near the top, such as '$version =' or 'TinyFileManager version'). Compare the found version to the vendor's release history for versions that include the fix.Affected if The installed version is any version prior to the vendor patch that addresses path traversal in the file[] parameter.
-
Verify POST parameter handlingSend a benign POST request to /filemanager.php with a file[] parameter containing a simple directory traversal attempt (e.g., file[]=../../../test.txt) and observe if the application processes it without rejecting or sanitizing the path.Affected if The application accepts and processes the file[] POST parameter with directory traversal sequences without validation.
-
Check web server privilegesReview the user/group running the web server process (e.g., ps aux | grep -E 'apache|nginx|php-fpm|httpd') and verify which files the web server user can read on the system.Affected if The web server runs with privileges sufficient to read sensitive system files (such as /etc/passwd) that should not be accessible through the web application.
You are affected if TinyFileManager is installed, the file[] POST parameter accepts directory traversal sequences without sanitization, and the web server process has access to files outside the intended web directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation and sanitization on the file[] parameter to ensure paths are normalized and confined to allowed directories. Use basename() and realpath() to resolve and validate all file paths before processing.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-6496 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-6496 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data