CVE-2026-6696
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Zingaya Click-to-Call plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the 'email', 'first_name', 'last_name', and 'phone' parameters on the plugin's sign-up admin page in all versions up to, and including, 1.0. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Zingaya Click-to-Call WordPress plugin versions up to 1.0 contains a reflected XSS vulnerability in its admin sign-up page. The 'email', 'first_name', 'last_name', and 'phone' parameters are not properly sanitized on input or escaped on output, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious JavaScript via crafted URLs. Successful exploitation requires tricking a user into clicking a malicious link.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Zingaya Click-to-Call plugin is installedNavigate to WordPress admin > Plugins and look for 'Zingaya Click-to-Call' in the list of installed plugins, or check the directory wp-content/plugins/ for a folder containing 'zingaya' or 'click-to-call'Affected if The plugin is present in the plugins directory regardless of activation status
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Determine the installed plugin versionIn WordPress admin > Plugins, click on the plugin name to view its details and version number, or open the main plugin PHP file (e.g., zingaya-click-to-call.php) and read the 'Version' header in the plugin comment blockAffected if The version is 1.0 or any version up to and including 1.0 (no patched version is specified in the advisory)
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Confirm the plugin is activeIn WordPress admin > Plugins > Installed Plugins, check if Zingaya Click-to-Call shows as 'Active'Affected if The plugin is active and the vulnerable code is running
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Verify the admin sign-up page is accessibleAttempt to access the plugin's admin sign-up page, typically found under wp-admin options like 'Users > Sign Up' or a custom menu item named after the plugin; check for pages accepting email, first_name, last_name, or phone parametersAffected if The admin sign-up page loads and accepts user input via URL parameters (email, first_name, last_name, phone)
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Test for reflected XSS vulnerability in parametersUsing a browser or HTTP tool, access the admin sign-up page with a crafted URL such as ?email=test<script>alert(1)</script> or ?first_name=<img%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)> and check if the input is reflected unescaped in the page responseAffected if The parameter value is reflected in the HTML output without proper encoding (visible <script> tags or unescaped HTML attributes)
You are affected if the Zingaya Click-to-Call plugin version 1.0 or lower is installed, active, and the admin sign-up page is accessible with unescaped reflection of the email, first_name, last_name, or phone parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version of the plugin that implements proper input sanitization (e.g., sanitize_text_field) and output escaping (e.g., esc_html, esc_attr) for all user-supplied parameters. If no update exists, apply custom input filtering or disable the plugin until a fix is available.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-6696 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-6696 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data