CVE-2026-67429
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFlyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, image.download and related file-writing modules use caller-controlled output_dir instead of validate_path_with_env_config and its FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement, allowing attacker-controlled response bytes to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths the process can access. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceArbitrary file write vulnerability in Flyto2 Core's image.download and related file-writing modules. The modules use caller-controlled output_dir parameter directly instead of the secure validate_path_with_env_config function with FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement, allowing attackers to write response bytes to arbitrary filesystem paths accessible by the process.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Flyto2 Core versionLocate and inspect the Flyto2 Core installation to determine the currently installed version numberAffected if the installed version is lower than 2.26.6 (e.g., 2.26.5, 2.26.0, 2.25.x, etc.)
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Locate image.download module usageSearch the codebase or runtime environment for usages of image.download or related file-writing modules that accept an output_dir parameterAffected if image.download or related file-writing modules with caller-controlled output_dir are in use
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Verify validate_path_with_env_config is invokedInspect the image.download and file-writing modules to confirm they call validate_path_with_env_config on the output_dir parameter before useAffected if validate_path_with_env_config is NOT called or is bypassed for the output_dir parameter
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Check FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR configurationExamine the runtime configuration or environment variables to confirm FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is set and properly enforcedAffected if FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is not configured, is empty, or is not being enforced by the validation function
A user is affected if Flyto2 Core version is prior to 2.26.6 AND the image.download or file-writing modules use output_dir without validate_path_with_env_config enforcement of FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 2.26.6 or later which implements proper path validation using validate_path_with_env_config and enforces FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement.
2.26.6
- 1. Identify the current version of Flyto2 Core installed in your environment
- 2. If running a version prior to 2.26.6, upgrade to version 2.26.6 or later
- 3. After upgrading, verify that image.download and related file-writing modules now use validate_path_with_env_config with FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement
- 4. Test that file write operations are properly confined to the sandbox directory
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-67429 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-67429 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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