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OS Command InjectionWeakness · CWE-78

CVE-2026-69096

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-08-03
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click 2 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
OpenWrt luci-app-dockerman (LuCI master and openwrt-25.12 snapshots containing the ucode docker_rpc.uc RPC backend after the JS/ucode conversion) contains an OS command injection vulnerability. The package's read ACL grants broad ubus access to docker.* / docker.container.*, which exposes the docker.container.ttyd_start method even though it performs mutating operations. The run_ttyd handler builds a shell command from the request-controlled id, cmd, and uid fields and passes it to system() without quoting or argv-style execution in the rpcd root context. An authenticated attacker holding only the luci-app-dockerman read ACL can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., in id) to execute arbitrary commands as root via an HTTP POST to /ubus. openwrt-24.10 and openwrt-23.05 do not contain this backend and are not affected; no patched version was known as of the advisory.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

OpenWrt luci-app-dockerman contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the docker_rpc.uc RPC backend. The run_ttyd handler builds shell commands from user-controlled id, cmd, and uid fields and passes them to system() without proper quoting or argv-style execution, allowing authenticated attackers with read ACL to inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary commands as root via HTTP POST to /ubus.

MitigationUntil a patched version is available, remove or restrict the luci-app-dockerman package from affected systems. If the package is required, disable the docker.container.ttyd_start method via stricter ubus ACLs and isolate the management interface from untrusted networks.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify luci-app-dockerman is installed
    Check if the package exists on the OpenWrt system: run `opkg list-installed | grep luci-app-dockerman` or look for the docker controller directory at /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/docker/
    Affected if The package is installed and the docker controller directory exists at /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/docker/
  2. Confirm docker_rpc.uc file exists
    Inspect the file system for /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/docker/docker_rpc.uc using `ls -la /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/docker/docker_rpc.uc`
    Affected if The file docker_rpc.uc exists in the luci docker controller directory, indicating the vulnerable RPC backend is present
  3. Identify if run_ttyd handler is present
    Search for the run_ttyd function in docker_rpc.uc: run `grep -n 'run_ttyd' /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/docker/docker_rpc.uc`
    Affected if The run_ttyd function is defined in docker_rpc.uc, meaning the vulnerable code path exists
  4. Check if docker ubus methods are accessible
    Run `ubus list | grep docker` to enumerate available docker.* ubus methods, or attempt to call a docker method via `ubus call docker version` to confirm the service is exposed
    Affected if Docker ubus methods such as docker.docker_rpc or docker.containers are listed or callable, exposing the attack surface
  5. Verify user has access to docker ubus methods
    Check ACL configuration for the user or session attempting to access docker.* ubus methods. An attacker with read ACL on docker.* methods can exploit this vulnerability
    Affected if The authenticated user has any ACL permission (even read-only) on docker.* ubus methods, allowing them to send POST requests to /ubus

Your environment is affected if luci-app-dockerman with the docker_rpc.uc file is installed and the docker ubus methods are accessible to authenticated users, regardless of ACL level.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Until a patched version is available, remove or restrict the luci-app-dockerman package from affected systems. If the package is required, disable the docker.container.ttyd_start method via stricter ubus ACLs and isolate the management interface from untrusted networks.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

downgrade to openwrt-24.10 or openwrt-23.05 (no fixed release available)

  1. Identify if the system is running luci-app-dockerman from LuCI master or openwrt-25.12 snapshot branches
  2. If affected, downgrade to openwrt-24.10 or openwrt-23.05 which do not contain the vulnerable docker_rpc.uc backend
  3. As a mitigation, consider disabling luci-app-dockerman if Docker container management via LuCI is not required
  4. Monitor for OpenWrt security advisories regarding CVE-2026-69096 for patched releases
Caveat Downgrading OpenWrt versions may require reconfiguration and could affect other packages or settings

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
22.0 hours of engineering $3,860
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-69096 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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