CVE-2026-6937
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.11.8 due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action via the bulk appointments REST API endpoint. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify arbitrary appointment records including customer PII, payment status, and meeting URL fields, and to expose full customer PII from existing appointment records via the bulk endpoint response. The public nonce is a static, user-independent value present in the HTML source of any page hosting the [ssa_booking] shortcode, meaning any visitor who has viewed such a page can obtain it and target any appointment in the system without authentication.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Simply Schedule Appointments plugin fails to enforce authorization checks on its bulk appointments REST API endpoint. The endpoint uses a static, user-independent nonce exposed in the HTML of any page with the [ssa_booking] shortcode, allowing unauthenticated attackers to view and modify arbitrary appointment records including customer PII, payment status, and meeting URLs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify plugin installationIn WordPress admin, go to Plugins > Installed Plugins and locate 'Simply Schedule Appointments'. Note the version number displayed. Alternatively, check the plugin files in wp-content/plugins/simply-schedule-appointments/Affected if Plugin is installed and version is below 1.6.11.9
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Check for shortcode exposureSearch your WordPress posts, pages, and widgets for the [ssa_booking] shortcode. View the HTML source of any page containing this shortcode and look for a nonce value in a hidden field or script - this nonce is static and user-independent.Affected if The [ssa_booking] shortcode is present on any public page, exposing the static nonce in HTML
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Verify REST API accessibilitySend a GET request to the bulk appointments endpoint (typically /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments/bulk or similar path under wp-json/ssa/). No authentication should be required to confirm the endpoint responds.Affected if The REST API endpoint responds without requiring authentication or valid user session
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Confirm appointment data exposureUse the exposed nonce from step 2 to craft a request to the bulk appointments endpoint and examine if appointment records including customer PII, payment status, and meeting URLs are returned without authorization.Affected if Arbitrary appointment records can be viewed or modified without proper authorization
You are affected if the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin is installed with a version below 1.6.11.9 and the [ssa_booking] shortcode is in use, exposing a static nonce that allows unauthorized access to appointment data via the REST API.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate the plugin to version 1.6.11.9 or later which contains proper authorization checks; alternatively, temporarily disable the plugin or restrict REST API access at the server level until patching is possible.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,560.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-6937 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- www.wordfence.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-6937 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data