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InjectionWeakness · CWE-74

CVE-2026-7058

HIGH · 7.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-04-26
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
82/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A vulnerability has been found in 666ghj MiroFish up to 0.1.2. The impacted element is the function SimulationIPCClient.send_command of the file backend/app/services/simulation_ipc.py of the component Inter-Process Communication. Such manipulation leads to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Command injection vulnerability in the SimulationIPCClient.send_command function within the Inter-Process Communication component of MiroFish. The function fails to properly sanitize input before passing it to system command execution, allowing remote attackers to inject arbitrary commands.

MitigationImplement strict input validation and sanitization for all data passed to send_command, preferably using a whitelist approach or parameterized command execution to prevent shell command injection.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify MiroFish installation
    Search for MiroFish binary or installation directory: find / -name '*MiroFish*' 2>/dev/null or check common install paths like /opt/MiroFish, /usr/local/mirofish, or Program Files/MiroFish on Windows
    Affected if MiroFish is not found on the system - not applicable
  2. Determine MiroFish version
    Run 'MiroFish --version' or check version file in installation directory (version.txt, VERSION, or similar)
    Affected if Version is within the affected range (or version cannot be determined and SimulationIPCClient component exists)
  3. Locate SimulationIPCClient module
    Search for SimulationIPCClient.py or SimulationIPCClient module in the MiroFish installation: find <mirofish_path> -name '*SimulationIPCClient*'
    Affected if SimulationIPCClient module exists and is present in the installation
  4. Inspect send_command function for input handling
    Examine the send_command function source code in SimulationIPCClient for unsanitized input passed to system/shell commands (look for os.system, subprocess with shell=True, or similar)
    Affected if Code shows direct use of user input in system calls without sanitization or parameterization
  5. Check IPC server configuration
    Review MiroFish IPC configuration files (ipc_config.json, config.xml, or similar in conf/ or config/ directory) to see if SimulationIPCClient.send_command is exposed or enabled
    Affected if IPC component is enabled and send_command is exposed to network/untrusted input
  6. Verify external input paths
    Check logs or network connections to determine if SimulationIPCClient.send_command receives input from external sources (network IPC ports, API endpoints, or untrusted clients)
    Affected if send_command accepts input from external or untrusted sources without validation

User is affected if MiroFish with SimulationIPCClient component is installed and the send_command function handles external input without proper sanitization.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all data passed to send_command, preferably using a whitelist approach or parameterized command execution to prevent shell command injection.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
22.0 hours of engineering $3,860
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7058 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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