CVE-2026-7084
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was found in HBAI-Ltd Toonflow-app up to 1.1.1. This affects the function fetch of the file src/routes/setting/vendorConfig/getCodeByLink.ts of the component getCodeByLink Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument Link results in server-side request forgery. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. There is ongoing doubt regarding the real existence of this vulnerability. The vendor explains in a reply to the issue report, that "[t]he /getCodeByLink interface is used to obtain TS code and run it locally. It is inherently a high-risk interface, and users must clearly understand the risks before requesting to use it."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the getCodeByLink endpoint (src/routes/setting/vendorConfig/getCodeByLink.ts). The fetch function accepts a user-controllable Link parameter that can be manipulated to make the server request arbitrary URLs, potentially accessing internal services or sensitive resources.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the vulnerable endpoint fileSearch the codebase for the file 'getCodeByLink.ts' in the path 'src/routes/setting/vendorConfig/'Affected if The file exists in the codebase and contains a fetch or similar HTTP request function that uses a Link parameter from user input
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Identify if the endpoint is routedSearch for references to getCodeByLink in router or route configuration files, or check if the file is imported in the main application entry pointAffected if The endpoint is imported and registered in the application's routing configuration, making it accessible via HTTP
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Verify the Link parameter is user-controllableExamine the getCodeByLink.ts file and look for how the Link parameter is obtained (e.g., from req.query, req.params, req.body) and passed directly to a fetch or HTTP request functionAffected if The code retrieves Link from user input (query string, URL parameter, or request body) without sanitization and passes it to fetch without validation
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Confirm network accessibility of the endpointAttempt to access the endpoint path (typically /setting/vendorConfig/getCodeByLink or similar) via HTTP request, checking if authentication is requiredAffected if The endpoint responds without requiring authentication or if authentication can be bypassed, allowing external access to the SSRF-prone functionality
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Check for URL validation logicInspect the code around the fetch call to see if there is any URL allowlist, hostname validation, or domain restriction logic before the request is madeAffected if No URL validation, allowlist, or domain restriction is implemented before the fetch call executes with the user-provided Link parameter
You are affected if the getCodeByLink endpoint exists in your codebase, is exposed via routing, and the Link parameter is passed directly to a fetch call without strict URL validation or authentication requirements.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict URL allowlist validation for the Link parameter, restrict network access to trusted domains only, require authentication for the endpoint, and consider disabling or deprecating the interface if the functionality is not essential given its inherent high-risk nature.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7084 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7084 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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