CVE-2026-7123
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was found in Totolink A8000RU 7.1cu.643_b20200521. Affected is the function setIptvCfg of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi of the component CGI Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument setIptvCfg results in os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceOS command injection vulnerability in Totolink A8000RU router's CGI handler. The setIptvCfg function in /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi accepts unsanitized user input that gets passed to system shell commands, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelAccess the router's web admin interface or check the device label/marketing materials to confirm the exact model is Totolink A8000RUAffected if Device is not a Totolink A8000RU unit
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Confirm CGI endpoint existsAttempt to access http://<router-ip>/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi via HTTP or HTTPS. A valid response (even an error) indicates the CGI handler is presentAffected if The CGI endpoint returns a response (vulnerable code path may be present)
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Check if remote management is enabledLog into the router admin panel and look for 'Remote Management', 'Remote Access', or similar settings under System or Administration menus. Determine if access from WAN/internet is permittedAffected if Remote management or WAN access to the web interface is enabled
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Inspect for signs of command injectionCheck router system logs for suspicious commands, unexpected processes, or new user accounts. Look for unfamiliar entries in /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow if shell access is availableAffected if Unexpected commands, scripts, or unauthorized accounts are found in logs or system files
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Verify firmware versionCheck the router's admin interface under 'Firmware Version', 'Status', or 'System Information' page for the installed firmware build date and version stringAffected if Firmware is older than any vendor patch date (no patch date provided; compare to current firmware on vendor website if available)
You are affected if you have a Totolink A8000RU router with the CGI interface exposed and remote management enabled, or if signs of unauthorized command execution are present in the system
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor firmware patch if available; otherwise isolate affected devices behind a firewall or disable remote management. Consider replacing device if no patch is forthcoming.
A8000RU firmware version newer than 7.1cu.643_b20200521 (check Totolink.net for latest release)
- 1. Visit the official Totolink support page at www.totolink.net and navigate to the A8000RU product support section
- 2. Check for available firmware updates newer than version 7.1cu.643_b20200521
- 3. Download the latest stable firmware release for the A8000RU router
- 4. Access the router's web administration interface (typically at 192.168.1.1)
- 5. Navigate to the Administration or System settings section
- 6. Locate the Firmware Upgrade or Update option
- 7. Upload and apply the new firmware version
- 8. After the upgrade completes, verify the router is functioning normally and confirm the new firmware version is installed
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7123 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7123 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data