CVE-2026-7217
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security vulnerability has been detected in Deepractice PromptX up to 2.4.0. The affected element is the function read_docx/read_xlsx/read_pptx/list_xlsx_sheets/read_pdf of the file packages/mcp-office/src/index.ts of the component Document File Handler. Such manipulation of the argument path leads to absolute path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceAbsolute path traversal vulnerability in Deepractice PromptX's Document File Handler. The functions read_docx, read_xlsx, read_pptx, list_xlsx_sheets, and read_pdf in packages/mcp-office/src/index.ts accept unsanitized path arguments, allowing remote attackers to access arbitrary files on the system by providing absolute paths outside the intended directory.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Deepractice PromptX is installedSearch for the 'promptx' or 'deepractice' package in your environment using 'pip list' or 'npm list' depending on your package manager, or look for the packages/mcp-office directory in your project.Affected if The Deepractice PromptX package or mcp-office component is present in your environment.
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Locate the mcp-office package versionCheck the version of the mcp-office package in your dependency lock file (package-lock.json, package.json, requirements.txt, or Pipfile) or run 'npm list @deepractice/mcp-office' or 'pip show deep-practice-promptx' if available.Affected if The installed version has not been patched for path traversal vulnerabilities in the document handlers.
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Verify if vulnerable file handler functions are exposedReview your application code or API endpoints that call read_docx, read_xlsx, read_pptx, list_xlsx_sheets, or read_pdf functions from the mcp-office package. Check if these functions accept user-controlled path input.Affected if Any of these functions (read_docx, read_xlsx, read_pptx, list_xlsx_sheets, read_pdf) are accessible and accept path parameters without validation.
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Inspect the path validation logic in index.tsExamine the source code in packages/mcp-office/src/index.ts around the document file handler functions. Look for path validation or sanitization before file operations.Affected if The code lacks validation that rejects absolute paths or traversal sequences (../) in the path argument.
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Test for path traversal exposureIf you have access to the function interface, attempt to pass an absolute path like '/etc/passwd' or a path with '../' to any of the vulnerable functions and observe if unauthorized file contents are returned.Affected if The functions return contents of files outside the intended directory when given absolute or traversal paths.
You are affected if Deepractice PromptX with the mcp-office package is installed and its document handler functions (read_docx, read_xlsx, read_pptx, list_xlsx_sheets, read_pdf) accept unvalidated path input that allows reading files outside the intended directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation and path normalization: validate that resolved paths remain within allowed directories, reject absolute path inputs or strip dangerous path components, and apply allowlist restrictions on accessible file locations.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7217 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7217 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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