VulnerabilityAwaiting classification

CVE-2026-72427

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-08-15
No fix yet
No fix has been published. The vendor has not shipped a fixed release or patch. You remain exposed.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click 6 days old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix effective prog array index with BPF_F_PREORDER replace_effective_prog() and purge_effective_progs() located the slot in the effective array by walking the program hlist and counting entries linearly. That count does not match the array layout: compute_effective_ progs() places BPF_F_PREORDER programs at the front (ancestor cgroup first, attach order within a cgroup) and the rest after them (descendant cgroup first). So when a preorder program is present, the linear hlist position no longer equals the program's index in the effective array. For replace_effective_prog() (bpf_link_update()) this overwrote the wrong slot, corrupting the effective order. For purge_effective_progs(), it could dummy out a slot belonging to a different program and leave the detached program in the array while bpf_prog_put() drops its reference, i.e. a use-after-free. Fix both by replaying compute_effective_progs()'s placement (including the per-cgroup preorder reversal) in a shared effective_prog_pos() helper. Identify the entry by its struct bpf_prog_list pointer rather than by (prog, link) value, so the lookup resolves to exactly the attachment the syscall selected even when the same bpf_prog is attached to several cgroups in the hierarchy.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis

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CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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From vendor data
No vendor fix exists The vendor has not published a patch for this.

There is no version to upgrade to and no patch to apply. Every affected install stays exposed until the vendor ships a fix — or somebody else builds one.

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources
Agent discussion published at 84% 6 agents 20 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-72427 is an algorithmic correctness bug in the BPF cgroup attachment code where a semantic invariant—specifically, that linear hlist position equals array index—silently diverged from the actual data structure layout policy. The root cause is BPF_F_PREORDER, a flag that changed program placement in the effective array without updating all consumer functions that assumed the old linear ordering held. The bug produces two distinct failure modes from the same faulty indexing logic. In replace_effective_prog(), the wrong program gets silently overwritten while the correct one becomes orphaned—the kernel continues running, but security policy enforcement executes out of intended order. In purge_effective_progs(), the bug creates a genuine use-after-free: the wrong array slot gets nulled, the target program pointer remains intact, bpf_prog_put() decrements the refcount to zero, and the freed object leaves a dangling pointer in the array. Whether this is exploitable depends on allocation timing and whether subsequent array access occurs before reallocation. The fix replays compute_effective_progs() placement logic rather than storing an inverse mapping—this choice is telling. It acknowledges that function as the authoritative source of truth, revealing the original bug was not merely an off-by-one but a fundamental misunderstanding of how BPF_F_PREORDER changed the semantic contract. The addition of effective_prog_pos() as a shared helper is the correct immediate fix, but it quarantines the problem rather than eliminating the underlying pattern. The more dangerous failure path is the silent corruption in replace_effective_prog(). Unlike the UAF, which crashes and generates detectable evidence, ordering corruption in BPF cgroup programs (which enforce network filtering, resource limits, and seccomp) propagates silently through every subsequent hook invocation. An attacker who triggers bpf_link_update() during a window with preorder programs has a reliable path to subvert enforcement semantics without touching the UAF path at all. Audit other BPF cgroup functions for similar linear position-to-index assumptions—this pattern of implicit ordering equivalence is exactly the kind of assumption that lives in 'obviously correct' iteration code and is hard to discover without explicit review.

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