CVE-2026-7272
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw has been found in WilliamCloudQi matlab-mcp-server up to ab88f6b9bf5f36f725e8628029f7f6dd0d9913ca. The affected element is the function generate_matlab_code/execute_matlab_code of the file src/index.ts of the component MCP Interface. Executing a manipulation of the argument scriptPath can lead to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA path traversal vulnerability exists in WilliamCloudQi's matlab-mcp-server MCP Interface (src/index.ts), specifically in the generate_matlab_code and execute_matlab_code functions. The scriptPath parameter is not properly validated, allowing remote attackers to manipulate it using directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../) to access files outside the intended directory.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if matlab-mcp-server is installedCheck your node_modules or Python environment for the @williamcloudqi/matlab-mcp-server package, or look for the src/index.ts file in your project. Run 'npm list @williamcloudqi/matlab-mcp-server' or 'pip list | grep matlab-mcp-server' depending on your package manager.Affected if The package is not present in your environment
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Determine the installed versionRun 'npm list @williamcloudqi/matlab-mcp-server version' or check the package.json version field. Compare your version against any available patched versions from the vendor.Affected if You have an older unpatched version of matlab-mcp-server installed
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Verify the MCP server exposes the vulnerable functionsInspect the src/index.ts file in the matlab-mcp-server installation directory. Look for the generate_matlab_code and execute_matlab_code function definitions and confirm they accept a scriptPath parameter.Affected if Your installation contains src/index.ts with these functions accepting scriptPath parameter
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Check if input validation exists on scriptPathReview the source code for the generate_matlab_code and execute_matlab_code functions. Look for path validation logic such as allowlist patterns, realpath canonicalization, or base directory enforcement before file operations.Affected if No path validation, allowlisting, or directory containment checks are found in the code handling scriptPath
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Test if directory traversal is possibleIf you have access to the MCP interface, attempt to invoke the function with a scriptPath containing traversal sequences like ../../etc/passwd or ../../../../../../../../etc/hostname and observe if files outside the intended directory are accessed or returned.Affected if The function returns file contents from paths outside the intended base directory when using ../ sequences
You are affected if you have the WilliamCloudQi matlab-mcp-server installed with vulnerable generate_matlab_code or execute_matlab_code functions accessible and no input validation exists on the scriptPath parameter to prevent directory traversal.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation on the scriptPath parameter using allowlist patterns, perform path canonicalization (realpath) to resolve symlinks and normalize paths, and verify the final resolved path stays within an authorized base directory before any file operations.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7272 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7272 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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