CVE-2026-72798 is a transitive information disclosure vulnerability in SiYuan's database linking feature. If you publish any database—even a trivial one like a reading list—you may be inadvertently exposing content from every database it references through Relation or Rollup cells. The attack requires no authentication: an anonymous reader requests the published database and receives related content from hidden, password-protected databases that should be inaccessible to them. This is not a missing patch; it's a fundamental mismatch between how SiYuan's permission model was designed and how its linking features actually work. The permission system gates access at the database level. The related-database feature creates information flows that cross those gates. These two systems were never designed to account for each other, and no amount of per-database access control stops a published database from acting as a relay to everything it touches. The vulnerability earned a CVSS 8.6 because the blast radius scales with the interconnectedness of your knowledge graph. One public database referencing a sensitive internal database is enough. In knowledge management tools, this is the norm, not the edge case. The fix in v3.7.4 likely addresses the specific Relation/Rollup render path, but you should assume other transitive paths exist. Audit every database marked for public or anonymous access. Remove Relation and Rollup cells that point to protected databases, or accept that any database you publish becomes a map of everything it references. If your threat model includes sensitive internal research, interview notes, or client data, treat published databases as externally visible graph nodes—assume an attacker who obtains one will enumerate what it touches. The underlying architectural problem won't be solved by one patch; it requires treating information flow as a first-class security concern in a product designed around linking.
CVE-2026-72798
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to properly filter related-database content in renderAttributeView, allowing anonymous readers to access Relation and Rollup cell contents from hidden or password-protected databases. Attackers can request published databases that relate to restricted databases to retrieve sensitive content, or bypass row filtering entirely when the first column is a non-block type.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe application checks who you are but not whether you're allowed to perform a given action, so any authenticated user can reach things meant for others. This is the classic “change the ID in the URL” bug. The fix is an authorization check on every request, evaluated against the acting user's permissions.
General guidance for the missing authorization class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedv3.7.4
- 1. Back up your current SiYuan data and configuration
- 2. Download SiYuan v3.7.4 or later from the official GitHub releases page (https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases)
- 3. Stop the running SiYuan instance
- 4. Install the updated version
- 5. Restart the SiYuan service
- 6. Verify that published databases no longer expose Relation and Rollup cell contents from restricted databases
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
There is no version to upgrade to and no patch to apply. Every affected install stays exposed until the vendor ships a fix — or somebody else builds one.
Free. We build fixes in the order the community asks for them — and we’ll tell you the moment this one lands.
We develop and verify an original fix where the vendor hasn’t, from $4,900. Deployed to your staging first — never straight to production.
Scope it with usSee what else the community needs solved on the solutions-needed board.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-72798 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesCVE-2026-72798 is a transitive information disclosure vulnerability in SiYuan's database linking feature. If you publish any database—even a trivial one like a reading list—you may be inadvertently exposing content from every database it references through Relation or Rollup cells. The attack requires no authentication: an anonymous reader requests the published database and receives related content from hidden, password-protected databases that should be inaccessible to them. This is not a missing patch; it's a fundamental mismatch between how SiYuan's permission model was designed and how its linking features actually work. The permission system gates access at the database level. The related-database feature creates information flows that cross those gates. These two systems were never designed to account for each other, and no amount of per-database access control stops a published database from acting as a relay to everything it touches. The vulnerability earned a CVSS 8.6 because the blast radius scales with the interconnectedness of your knowledge graph. One public database referencing a sensitive internal database is enough. In knowledge management tools, this is the norm, not the edge case. The fix in v3.7.4 likely addresses the specific Relation/Rollup render path, but you should assume other transitive paths exist. Audit every database marked for public or anonymous access. Remove Relation and Rollup cells that point to protected databases, or accept that any database you publish becomes a map of everything it references. If your threat model includes sensitive internal research, interview notes, or client data, treat published databases as externally visible graph nodes—assume an attacker who obtains one will enumerate what it touches. The underlying architectural problem won't be solved by one patch; it requires treating information flow as a first-class security concern in a product designed around linking.
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-72798 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data