CVE-2026-7368
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Yarbo cloud does not enforce per-device or per-user authorization. Any client possessing valid credentials, whether the shared hard-coded credentials or legitimate per-user credentials, can subscribe to wildcard topics covering all robots globally, and can publish to any robot's command topic using only the robot's serial number (disclosed in the telemetry stream). Even after removal of hard-coded credentials from the app, a single compromised credential could still provide fleet-wide access without per-device access controls.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Yarbo cloud platform lacks per-device and per-user authorization enforcement. Authenticated users can subscribe to wildcard MQTT topics that receive telemetry from all robots globally, and can publish commands to any robot using only its serial number (which is exposed in the telemetry stream). This allows a single compromised credential to access the entire robot fleet.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Inspect MQTT broker topic subscription configurationReview the MQTT topic subscription settings or client configurations to determine if wildcard topics such as '#', '+', or 'robots/#' are permitted for user connectionsAffected if Wildcard MQTT subscriptions are allowed and can receive telemetry from robots not owned by the authenticated user
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Verify MQTT publish authorization controlsTest whether an authenticated user can publish command messages to a robot using only its serial number, without the system validating ownership or user-device associationAffected if Any authenticated user can publish commands to any robot serial number without ownership validation
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Check for per-device access control enforcementExamine the application or API configuration to determine if there are access control lists or ownership checks that restrict users to only their authorized devicesAffected if No per-device or per-user authorization checks exist in the MQTT publish/subscribe flow
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Examine telemetry data for serial number exposureCapture or review the MQTT telemetry stream to confirm whether robot serial numbers are exposed in plaintext within the telemetry payloadAffected if Telemetry messages contain serial numbers that can be harvested to target other robots
A user is affected if the system permits wildcard MQTT subscriptions or allows any authenticated user to publish commands to robots without verifying device ownership.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement per-device access control lists that tie devices to specific users, enforce ownership validation on all subscribe and publish operations, remove wildcard topic subscriptions, and ensure each user can only access their authorized devices.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $13,440.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7368 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7368 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data