CVE-2026-7381
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPlack::Middleware::XSendfile versions through 1.0053 for Perl can allow client-controlled path rewriting. Plack::Middleware::XSendfile allows the variation setting (sendfile type) to be set by the client via the X-Sendfile-Type header, if it is not considered in the middleware constructor or the Plack environment. A malicious client can set the X-Sendfile-Type header to "X-Accel-Redirect" to services running behind nginx reverse proxies, and then set the X-Accel-Mapping to map the path to an arbitrary file on the server. Since 1.0053, Plack::Middleware::XSendfile is deprecated and will be removed from future releases of Plack. This is similar to CVE-2025-61780 for Rack::Sendfile, although Plack::Middleware::XSendfile has some mitigations that disallow regular expressions to be used in the mapping, and only apply the mapping for the "X-Accel-Redirect" type.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePlack::Middleware::XSendfile allows attackers to control the X-Sendfile-Type HTTP header, enabling them to set it to 'X-Accel-Redirect' for nginx reverse proxies and abuse the X-Accel-Mapping configuration to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating file paths.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.0053CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed Plack versionRun `perl -MPlack -e 'print $Plack::VERSION . "\n"'` or use your Perl distribution's module manager to query the Plack versionAffected if The version is 1.0053 or lower
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Identify if XSendfile middleware is loadedSearch your Plack application configuration (psgi files, startup scripts) for 'Plack::Middleware::XSendfile' or 'enable "XSendfile"'Affected if The middleware is explicitly loaded in your application configuration
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Verify if client headers can control sendfile behaviorInspect your Plack application code and middleware stack to determine whether HTTP headers X-Sendfile-Type and X-Accel-Mapping from client requests are passed to the XSendfile middleware without sanitizationAffected if The application accepts and processes X-Sendfile-Type or X-Accel-Mapping headers directly from incoming HTTP requests without server-side validation
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Confirm nginx proxy configurationIf using nginx as a reverse proxy, check if X-Accel-Redirect handling is enabled and whether the application has defined X-Accel-Mappings that could be overriddenAffected if nginx is configured to honor X-Accel-Redirect headers from the backend application
You are affected if you run Plack version 1.0053 or lower with the XSendfile middleware enabled and your application processes X-Sendfile-Type or X-Accel-Mapping headers from client requests without server-side validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 1.0054 or later if available, otherwise remove or disable Plack::Middleware::XSendfile; alternatively, ensure the X-Sendfile-Type header cannot be set by clients and is validated server-side in the middleware constructor.
- 1. Stop using Plack::Middleware::XSendfile - the module is deprecated and will be removed from future Plack releases.
- 2. Review your application for any dependencies on X-Sendfile/X-Accel-Redirect functionality.
- 3. Implement file serving directly through your application code or use your web server's native mechanisms instead.
- 4. Remove the Plack::Middleware::XSendfile middleware from your Plack middleware stack.
- 5. If you require sendfile functionality, evaluate alternative approaches compatible with your deployment environment.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7381 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7381 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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