CVE-2026-7504
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw was found in Keycloak's URL validation logic during redirect operations. By crafting a malicious request, an attacker could bypass validation to redirect users to unauthorized URLs, potentially leading to the exposure of sensitive information within the domain or facilitating further attacks. This vulnerability specifically affects Keycloak clients configured with a wildcard (*) in the "Valid Redirect URIs" field and requires user interaction to be successfully exploited. The issue stems from a discrepancy in how Keycloak and the underlying Java URI implementation handle the user-info component of a URL. If a malicious redirect URL is constructed using multiple @ characters in the user-info section, Java's URI parser fails to extract the user-info, leaving only the raw authority field. Consequently, Keycloak's validation check fails to detect the malformed user-info, falls back to a wildcard comparison, and incorrectly permits the malicious redirect.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceKeycloak's URL validation has a bypass vulnerability where crafted URLs with multiple @ characters in the user-info section cause Java's URI parser to fail extracting user-info, leaving raw authority. Keycloak's validator then falls back to wildcard comparison and incorrectly allows the malicious redirect. This only affects clients using wildcard (*) in Valid Redirect URIs and requires user interaction.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 26.4, < 26.4.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check Keycloak versionRun 'kc.sh version' or check the /opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh version, or inspect the keycloak-version in the container/package metadataAffected if The installed version is >= 26.4 and < 26.4.12
-
Identify clients with wildcard redirect URIsQuery the Keycloak database or use admin console to list all clients and inspect the 'redirectUris' or 'validRedirectUris' attribute for each client. Look for entries containing '*' as the entire value or as a wildcard patternAffected if Any client has a wildcard (*) configured in Valid Redirect URIs
Environment is affected if Keycloak version is between 26.4 and 26.4.11 inclusive AND at least one client is configured with wildcard (*) in Valid Redirect URIs
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped26.4.12
Remove wildcard (*) configurations from Valid Redirect URIs in all Keycloak clients and replace with specific, explicit redirect URIs. Review existing client configurations for wildcard usage.
26.4.12
- 1. Identify all Keycloak instances running version 26.4.x where 26.4 <= version < 26.4.12
- 2. Review all client configurations that use wildcard (*) in the 'Valid Redirect URIs' field
- 3. Schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade
- 4. Back up the Keycloak database and configuration
- 5. Upgrade Keycloak to version 26.4.12 or later
- 6. After upgrade, verify that open redirect validation works correctly by testing with crafted URLs containing multiple @ characters in the user-info section
- 7. Consider restricting wildcard redirect URIs to specific legitimate domains as a defense-in-depth measure
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7504 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7504 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data