CVE-2026-7542
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Slider Revolution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Disclosure in versions 7.0 to 7.0.10. This is due to three compounding design flaws: (1) the plugin leaks a valid backend AJAX nonce (revslider_actions) to all authenticated users including Subscribers via the admin_footer hook; (2) the wordpress.create.image_from_url action is explicitly allowlisted in the $user_allowed array, bypassing the administrator-only access control; (3) the create_wordpress_image_from_url() function accepts an attacker-controlled url parameter that is passed to import_media(), where path_or_url_exists() explicitly accepts local filesystem paths (file_exists() && is_readable()) with no restriction to remote HTTP/HTTPS URLs, and @copy() physically copies those files into the publicly accessible /wp-content/uploads/revslider/ai/ directory. The MIME type check trusts the attacker-supplied content_type parameter to derive the destination extension without verifying actual file content, and the source extension blacklist does not block many sensitive types (.sql, .log, .json, .bak, .xml, .csv, .conf, .yml, .yaml, .pem, .key, .crt, .txt, .db, etc.). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read the contents of server files with non-blacklisted extensions by having them copied to a publicly accessible URL.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Slider Revolution plugin (versions 7.0-7.0.10) leaks a backend AJAX nonce to all authenticated users including Subscribers, allows the wordpress.create.image_from_url action to bypass admin access controls, and the create_wordpress_image_from_url() function accepts attacker-controlled paths that get copied via import_media() to a publicly accessible /wp-content/uploads/revslider/ai/ directory, enabling authenticated attackers to read server files by having them copied to accessible URLs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Slider Revolution plugin versionOpen the plugin's main file (e.g., revslider/revslider.php) or view the plugin in the WordPress admin Plugins page and note the version number.Affected if Version is 7.0 through 7.0.10 inclusive.
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Confirm revslider_actions AJAX endpoint is exposed to subscribersSearch the plugin code for 'add_action( 'wp_ajax_revslider_actions'' and check if the action is hooked for any authenticated user (e.g., presence of 'wp_ajax_nopriv_revslider_actions' or lack of capability checks). Alternatively, attempt a request to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=revslider_actions using a subscriber-level user token.Affected if The endpoint responds to requests from users with Subscriber role.
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Locate create_wordpress_image_from_url function in plugin codeSearch the plugin directory for the function definition 'function create_wordpress_image_from_url'.Affected if The function exists in the plugin files.
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Identify @copy usage to web-accessible folderSearch the plugin code for '@copy' and verify that the destination path includes a publicly accessible directory such as wp-content/uploads.Affected if The plugin copies files to a location reachable via HTTP.
If the plugin version is between 7.0 and 7.0.10 and the revslider_actions AJAX endpoint can be accessed by subscribers, the environment is affected.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to Slider Revolution version 7.0.11 or later; alternatively, disable the plugin until a patch is available.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7542 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7542 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data