CVE-2026-7593
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security vulnerability has been detected in Sunwood-ai-labs command-executor-mcp-server up to 0.1.0. This impacts the function execute_command of the file src/index.ts of the component MCP Interface. The manipulation leads to os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceOS command injection vulnerability in the execute_command function of the MCP server's src/index.ts file. User-supplied input is passed to OS command execution without proper sanitization, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate MCP server installationSearch for the src/index.ts file in your codebase or check node_modules for @modelcontextprotocol/server packages. Run: find . -path '*/node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/server*' -type d 2>/dev/null or grep -r 'execute_command' --include='*.ts' .Affected if The MCP server package is installed and its source code contains an execute_command function that processes user input
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Inspect the execute_command function implementationOpen the src/index.ts file and locate the execute_command function. Examine how it constructs and executes OS commands. Look for uses of exec(), shell_exec(), system(), or similar functions that invoke a shell interpreter.Affected if The function uses exec(), shell_exec(), or similar methods that invoke a shell interpreter with string concatenation rather than execFile with argument arrays
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Verify input handling in execute_commandTrace the function's parameters and identify all user-controllable inputs. Check if these inputs are passed directly to the command execution without validation, sanitization, or allowlisting.Affected if User-supplied parameters are concatenated directly into the command string without escaping, validation, or use of parameterized execution methods
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Determine if the server accepts external inputCheck the server's API endpoints, WebSocket handlers, or any input-receiving mechanisms (HTTP headers, query parameters, JSON body fields). Identify if execute_command can be triggered via network requests.Affected if The execute_command function is exposed via an API endpoint, WebSocket handler, or other network-accessible interface that accepts external requests
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Check for input validation or sanitizationSearch the codebase for validation functions, allowlists, or sanitization logic applied to input before it reaches execute_command. Look for patterns like regex validation, whitelist checks, or input escaping.Affected if No input validation, allowlisting, or sanitization is performed on parameters before they are passed to the OS command execution function
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Assess network exposureDetermine if the MCP server is listening on a network interface (0.0.0.0) rather than localhost only. Check configuration files or environment variables for bind addresses and port settings.Affected if The MCP server is bound to a non-localhost interface or exposed via a reverse proxy, making the command injection reachable by remote attackers
You are affected if the MCP server is deployed with the vulnerable execute_command function accessible to untrusted input without validation, allowing attackers to inject OS commands through the function's parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation and use parameterized command execution methods (e.g., avoid shell interpreter, use execFile with argument arrays instead of exec/shell). If possible, whitelist allowed commands.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7593 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7593 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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