This CVE exposes a strcpy-based stack buffer overflow in the UTT HiPER 1250GW's HTTP form handler at /goform/aspApBasicConfigUrcp. The vulnerability accepts an HTTP request parameter and copies it directly into a fixed-length stack buffer without bounds checking — textbook stack overflow, achievable by any attacker who can send HTTP requests to the device's web interface. On most SOHO routers, this interface is accessible from the LAN by default and may be exposed WAN-side depending on configuration. The CRITICAL 9.9 CVSS reflects both the trivially exploitable memory corruption and the device's position as the network's control plane: compromising the router collapses the security boundary between LAN and WAN, enabling DNS manipulation, traffic interception, and lateral movement to every connected device. This isn't a subtle logic flaw — it's a known-dangerous function pattern that every modern compiler warns about and every static analysis tool catches in seconds. The fact that it reached production firmware indicates either the build pipeline lacks these automated checks or they're configured to fail open. Beyond the immediate vulnerability, the exposure pattern matters: this handler likely supports a deprecated feature (USB modem, VoIP, or legacy networking) that was removed from the web UI but whose backend code remained in the binary. Deprecated features that lose UI exposure stop receiving security review — but the HTTP handlers remain live and reachable. This means other zombie handlers almost certainly exist in the same firmware, processing unsanitized network input with zero ongoing security coverage. Assume UTT's security response is minimal or non-existent — historical precedent for this class of device shows either no patch, a rushed patch introducing adjacent bugs, or patches arriving years late. Treat every deployed UTT router as carrying unpatched systemic debt. The immediate defensive priority is network isolation: place the device behind a properly segmented firewall, restrict LAN access to the web interface, and monitor for indicators of compromise like unexpected DNS changes or anomalous traffic patterns originating from the router.
CVE-2026-76004
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security vulnerability has been detected in UTT HiPER 1250GW up to 3.2.7-210907-180535. Affected by this vulnerability is the function strcpy of the file /goform/aspApBasicConfigUrcp of the component HTTP Handler. The manipulation of the argument pvid leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · low confidenceCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUTT HiPER 1250GW firmware version newer than 3.2.7-210907-180535 (contact vendor for exact patched release)
- 1. Identify the current firmware version of the UTT HiPER 1250GW device via the administrative web interface or device label.
- 2. Navigate to the official UTT Technologies support website (utt.com.cn) or authorized distributor portal.
- 3. Locate the downloads/firmware section for the HiPER 1250GW model.
- 4. Check for firmware versions newer than 3.2.7-210907-180535 that include security patches.
- 5. Download the latest stable firmware release from the official source.
- 6. Access the device's web-based administration panel and navigate to the System Management > Firmware Upgrade section.
- 7. Upload and apply the new firmware file, ensuring uninterrupted power during the upgrade process.
- 8. After reboot, verify the new firmware version is installed and confirm the vulnerability is resolved.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
There is no version to upgrade to and no patch to apply. Every affected install stays exposed until the vendor ships a fix — or somebody else builds one.
Free. We build fixes in the order the community asks for them — and we’ll tell you the moment this one lands.
We develop and verify an original fix where the vendor hasn’t, from $8,900. Deployed to your staging first — never straight to production.
Scope it with usSee what else the community needs solved on the solutions-needed board.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-76004 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesThis CVE exposes a strcpy-based stack buffer overflow in the UTT HiPER 1250GW's HTTP form handler at /goform/aspApBasicConfigUrcp. The vulnerability accepts an HTTP request parameter and copies it directly into a fixed-length stack buffer without bounds checking — textbook stack overflow, achievable by any attacker who can send HTTP requests to the device's web interface. On most SOHO routers, this interface is accessible from the LAN by default and may be exposed WAN-side depending on configuration. The CRITICAL 9.9 CVSS reflects both the trivially exploitable memory corruption and the device's position as the network's control plane: compromising the router collapses the security boundary between LAN and WAN, enabling DNS manipulation, traffic interception, and lateral movement to every connected device. This isn't a subtle logic flaw — it's a known-dangerous function pattern that every modern compiler warns about and every static analysis tool catches in seconds. The fact that it reached production firmware indicates either the build pipeline lacks these automated checks or they're configured to fail open. Beyond the immediate vulnerability, the exposure pattern matters: this handler likely supports a deprecated feature (USB modem, VoIP, or legacy networking) that was removed from the web UI but whose backend code remained in the binary. Deprecated features that lose UI exposure stop receiving security review — but the HTTP handlers remain live and reachable. This means other zombie handlers almost certainly exist in the same firmware, processing unsanitized network input with zero ongoing security coverage. Assume UTT's security response is minimal or non-existent — historical precedent for this class of device shows either no patch, a rushed patch introducing adjacent bugs, or patches arriving years late. Treat every deployed UTT router as carrying unpatched systemic debt. The immediate defensive priority is network isolation: place the device behind a properly segmented firewall, restrict LAN access to the web interface, and monitor for indicators of compromise like unexpected DNS changes or anomalous traffic patterns originating from the router.
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-76004 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data