CVE-2026-7638
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe App Builder – Create Native Android & iOS Apps On The Flight plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to and including 5.6.0. This is due to missing authorization validation in the `upload_avatar()` function, which accepts an attacker-controlled `user_id` parameter from the POST request body and uses it to update user meta without verifying that the authenticated requester owns or has permission to modify the target account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the profile avatar of any arbitrary user on the site, including administrators, by supplying a target `user_id` in the request body to the `/wp-json/app-builder/v1/upload-avatar` endpoint.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe App Builder WordPress plugin has an IDOR vulnerability in the upload_avatar() function. The function accepts a user-supplied user_id parameter from POST requests without verifying the authenticated user has permission to modify that target user, allowing any authenticated Subscriber-level user to update avatar metadata for arbitrary users including administrators.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm App Builder plugin is installedIn WordPress admin, go to Plugins > Installed Plugins and look for 'App Builder' or check the /wp-content/plugins/ directory for an app-builder folderAffected if The plugin is not installed
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Check the installed plugin versionIn WordPress adminPlugins list, find App Builder and note the version number displayed; alternatively, read the main plugin file header in /wp-content/plugins/app-builder/Affected if The installed version matches affected versions (compare to published vulnerability disclosure)
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Verify upload_avatar function existsCheck plugin source files for the upload_avatar() function - typically in includes/ or core/ directories within the plugin folderAffected if The function exists and is accessible to subscriber-level users
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Check if avatar upload endpoints are exposedUse a browser or HTTP tool to examine if POST requests to avatar-related endpoints (such as /wp-json/app-builder/v1/avatar or similar REST routes) accept a user_id parameter without authorization headersAffected if user_id parameter is accepted in POST requests without additional authorization validation
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Test for authorization bypassAs a low-privilege subscriber user, attempt to send a POST request with a user_id parameter pointing to an administrator account to modify that user's avatar metadataAffected if The request succeeds and modifies avatar data for the target user without proper permission check
If the App Builder plugin is installed, the upload_avatar function exists and accepts user_id from authenticated POST requests without verifying the requester has permission to modify that specific user, then the environment is vulnerable to this IDOR flaw.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd authorization validation to verify the requesting user owns or has permission to modify the target user_id before allowing avatar updates; restrict the update operation to only affect the current user's own avatar or require higher privilege levels.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-7638 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-7638 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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